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Introduction

Violence has hit the public schools. Images of students shooting each
other rerun in the nation's mind, like a recurring nightmare. To establish
order in the classrooms, teachers and administrators themselves have used
physical force to corporally punish and to grasp out-of-control students. 1 Using physical force implicates a student's constitutional right to personal security,Z a right safeguarded by both the Fourth3 and Fourteenth Amendments.4
1 Several educational psychologists have contended that striking children as punishment
teaches students to be violent and undermines their ability to learn. See Kathryn R. Urbonya,
Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to Control and Punish Students,_ CoRNELL J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y _, _ (2001) (forthcoming). States have differed in
the authority that they give school officials to use physical force as punishment. See infra note
117 (listing state statutes). Some school districts have expressly adopted policies prohibiting
corporal punishment, while at the same time recognizing that school officials may need to use
force to control disruptive students. See, e.g., Taylor v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 143
F.3d 679, 680 n.l (2d Cir. 1998):
Corporal punishment is not an effective means of developing self-discipline. The
[Brentwood Union Free School] District will not condone or accept the use of
physical force (corporal punishment) upon a pupil for the purpose of punishing that
pupil. Reasonable physical force used for the following purposes is not to be misconstrued as corporal punishment: (1) to protect oneself from physical injury; (2) to
protect another pupil or teacher or any other person from physical injury; (3) to
protect the property of the school or of others; (4) to restrain or remove a pupil
whose behavior is interfering with the orderly exercise and performance of school
district functions, powers or duties, if that pupil has refused to comply with a request to refrain from further disruptive acts.
Some courts have distinguished between force to punish students and force to restrain students,
but nevertheless have applied the same analysis to both types of claims. See, e.g., Jones v. Wilinski, 931 F. Supp. 364, 367 (M.D. Pa. 1996):
Strictly speaking, [the student] does not allege that he was subjected to excessive
corporal punishment. Our interpretation of this claim is that [the teacher] used
excessive force in attempting to remove him physically from his chair and propel
him toward the door after ordering him to leave the classroom. The allegations are,
however, closely enough allied with claims of corporal punishment that cases involving the latter apply analogous principles and provide useful guidelines for deciding the [teacher's] summary judgment motion.
2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") has characterized this "right" in numerous ways: "the right to bodily integrity, the right to be free from
'unjustified intrusions on personal security,'... the right to be free from excessive force, [and]
the right to be free from arbitrary and excessive corporal punishment." P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d
1298, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)) (internal citations omitted). See also Wallace ex rei. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014-15
(7th Cir. 1995) (examining whether a teacher unreasonably restricted a student's interest in "liberty" under the Fourth Amendment when he grabbed a student's elbow to expedite the student's
departure). Most courts, however, have analyzed students' physical force claims under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000) ("We ... join
the vast majority of Circuits in confirming that excessive corporal punishment, at least where not
administered in conformity with a valid policy authorizing corporal punishment[,] ... may be
actionable under the Due Process Clause when it is tantamount to arbitrary, egregious, and
conscience-shocking behavior.").
3 U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.
4 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ 1.
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The Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause,
prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures,''5 and the Fourteenth Amendment bars deprivations of "life" and "liberty without due process." 6 Both
amendments protect the historic right to personal security.? Nevertheless,
under "the Rule of Graham,'' 8 only one amendment applies when officials
use physical force: "[W]here another provision of the Constitution 'provides
an explicit textual source of constitutional protection,' a court must assess a
s U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. This Article uses the phrase the "Fourth Amendment" as
shorthand for the rights that students have under the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (stating that the "Fourteenth Amendment extends [the Fourth Amendment]
guarantee to searches and seizures by state officials, . . . including public school officials") (citing
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985)).
6 U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV. This Article discusses the substantive due process component
of the Fourteenth Amendment and only briefly refers to its protection of procedural due process. See infra Part ll.E.2 & Part III.A.2. See generally Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26
{1990) (explaining that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses
three types of claims: {!)"specific protections defined in the Bill of Rights"; (2) a "substantive
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions 'regardless of the fairness of
the procedures used to implement them"' (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)); and {3) "a guarantee of fair procedure"). For discussion of substantive due process
claims see, for example, London v. Dirs. of the Dewitt Pub. Schs., 194 F.3d 873, 877 {8th Cir.
1999) (recognizing that a coach's use of force implicated a student's Fourteenth Amendment
interest in personal security, but deciding that the force was constitutional because it was not
"shocking to the conscience"); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988)
(stating that "at some point the administration of corporal punishment may violate a student's
liberty interest in his personal security and substantive due process rights"); Metzger ex ref.
Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520-21 {3d Cir. 1988) (stating that disciplining a student by
using excessive force may violate the child's liberty interest safeguarded by substantive due process); Webb v. McCulloch, 828 F.2d 1151, 1159 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing grant of summary
judgment for school principal, and holding that substantive due process applied because the
"need to strike [the student] was so minimal or non-existent that the alleged blows were a brutal
and inhumane abuse of . . . official power, literally shocking to the conscience"); Garcia ex. rel.
Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 656 {lOth Cir. 1987) (stating that corporal punishments "that are
so grossly excessive as to be shocking to the conscience violate substantive due process rights,
without regard to the adequacy of state remedies"); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir.
1980) (stating that corporal punishment is actionable under substantive due process if it
"amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience"); Jones v. Witinski, 931 F. Supp. 364, 366 {M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that "disciplinary
corporal punishment of public school students by teachers or administrators" may "give rise to a
claim under the Substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Meyer ex. rei.
Wyrick v. Litwiller, 749 F. Supp. 981, 985-87 (W.D. Mo. 1990) {denying summary judgment of
substantive due process claims against teacher who did not know why he hit the student on the
head with his grade book, allegedly causing student to have neck and back pain).
7 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (stating that "[t]he right of
personal security is . . . protected by the Fourth Amendment, which was made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment because its protection was viewed as 'implicit in "the
concept of ordered liberty"... enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of
English-speaking peoples'" (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,27-28 (1949))); see also Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (stating that a police officer's frisking of a person for weapons "is a
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse
strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 772 {1966) (noting that "[t]he integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our
society").
s Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 {1989). See infra Part ll.D.
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plaintiff's claims under that explicit provision and 'not the more generalized
notion of "substantive due process.""' 9
For students challenging school officials' use of force, the difference between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments matters doctrinally: officials
violate the Fourth Amendment when they "unreasonably" seize a person, 10
but they violate the Fourteenth Amendment only when their actions "shockthe-conscience."11 The Graham rule thus creates a constitutional chasm-if
the Fourth Amendment applies to evaluating the constitutionality of school
officials' use of force, then students stand on the more protective ground of a
"reasonableness" standard; but if the Fourteenth Amendment applies, they
fall into the deep chasm of the Fourteenth Amendment's difficult "shocksthe-conscience" standard.
Historically, students have fallen into this chasm when they have used
the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment to
challenge a school official's authority to hit them as punishment for violating
school rules. 12 In contrast, courts have provided students with greater pro9 Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,293 (1999) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395). Graham
also stated that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or
not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a
'substantive due process' approach." !d. The Court recently quoted this "rule" again in County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 528 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). For a discussion of Lewis, see infra Part II.E.2.
10 See infra Part II.D.
11 See infra Part II.E.2.
12 Federal courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as affording little protection to students challenging disciplinary action. See Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76
F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that an official's slapping of a student across the face,
which did not result in "physical injury," was not actionable under the substantive due process
component of the Fourteenth Amendment because the slapping was not "brutal" or "i: humane"); Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560,565 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that "[e]ven if the
corporal punishment is excessive and beyond the common law privilege accorded school teachers it does not necessarily follow that the student's substantive due process rights have been
violated" and further explaining that actionable conduct must be "shocking to the conscience
and amount to a severe invasion of the student's personal security and autonomy"); Jones v.
Witinski, 931 F. Supp. 364, 371 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that a teacher's grabbing of a student to
remove him from his chair did not constitute a substantive due process violation because the
teacher lacked the intent to cause harm); Brooks v. Sch. Bd., 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1535-36 (E.D.
Va. 1983) (holding that no Fourteenth Amendment violation occurred when a teacher stuck a
student's arm with a straight pin to punish the student because this action did not "descend to
the level of a brutal and inhumane, conscience-shocking, episode").
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth Circuit") has significantly
and erroneously limited the scope of these substantive due process claims by holding that students have no substantive due process claim if state law provides adequate post-hitting remedies.
See, e.g., Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) (granting a principal's motion to
dismiss for failure to state a violation of substantive due process because state law provided both
civil and criminal remedies); accord Harris v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 882 F. Supp. 90, 90-91
(N.D. Miss. 1995) (citing numerous Fifth Circuit cases dismissing students' corporal punishment
claims because "adequate post-punishment remedies" were available). In 1990, the United
States Supreme Court clearly stated that substantive due process claims do not invite consideration of whether state law provides adequate post-deprivation remedies. See Zinermon v. Burch,
494 u.s. 113, 125 (1990).
In addition, the Supreme Court in dicta has stated that schools have no Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect students from hurting each other, even though students are often subject to
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tection when the students have invoked the Fourth Amendment to challenge
school officials' searches13 of their property or person for drugs, other types
of contraband, or stolen property. 14
The purpose of this Article is to advocate applying the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment, to evaluate the constitutionality of
school officials' intentional use of physical force to control or punish students.15 Many actions by school officials, in light of the Court's jurisprudence
compulsory attendance laws. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995).
When school officials sexually assault students, however, substantive due process protects their
right to personal security. See, e.g., Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d
432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "public school children have a constitutionally protected
right not to be sexually abused by school employees at school"); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.,
15 F.3d 443,445 (5th Cir.1994) (en bane) (holding that "schoolchildren do have a liberty interest
in their bodily integrity that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that physical sexual abuse by a school employee violated that right"); Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment encompasses "a student's right to be free from sexual assaults by his or her teachers");
Laura Oren, Section 1983 and Sex Abuse in Schools: Making a Federal Case Out of It, 72 CHI.KENT L. REv. 747, 817 (1997) (arguing that "it is necessary to derive the claims of students
sexually abused by their teachers from the Constitution of the United States, and not from ordinary crimes and torts").
Scholars have also discussed the lack of protection substantive due process affords schoolchildren from excessive corporal punishment. See, e.g., Victoria N. Benz, Corporal Punishment
in Today's Public Schools: Child Discipline or Legal Abuse, 13 J. Juv. L. 13, 25-26 (1992) (arguing that the courts' failure to define what is shocking conduct under the Fourteenth Amendment
is "startling because much of the corporal punishment now administered would probably be
deemed excessive by the general public, especially in light of this nation's heightened awareness
of child abuse"); Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public
Schools: Jurisprudence That Is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REv. 276, 310
(1994) ("[T]hus far, most federal courts have adopted a hands-off approach, in part because
corporal punishment is still viewed as a time-honored tradition. . . . Let us not allow more
children to be irreparably damaged simply because of the historical pedigree of schoolroom
beatings."); Irene M. Rosenberg, A Study in Irrationality: Refusal to Grant Substantive Due Process Protection Against Excessive Corporal Punishment in the Public Schools, 27 Hous. L. REv.
399, 400 (1990) (criticizing the Fifth Circuit for denying all substantive due process protection
when students have available state tort remedies); Carolyn P. Weiss, Curbing Violence or Teaching It: Criminal Immunity for Teachers Who Inflict Corporal Punishment, 74 WASH. U. L. REv.
1251, 1273 (1996) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "standard established by the circuits . . . renders federal substantive protection inherently inadequate and inconsequential").
See generally Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal
Regime Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 353, 359 (1998)
(examining parents' and other custodians' authority to use corporal punishment).
13 The cases litigated under the Fourth Amendment have focused on school searches, not
seizures, of students and their property. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 4 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT§ 10.11 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) (collecting cases in
which school officials have searched students). In his introduction, Professor LaFave summarized the major issues the cases consider: first, whether the Fourth Amendment applies to school
officials' actions; second, whether school officials can give effective third party consent to
searches of students by police officers; and third, whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence found during searches made by school officials. I d. at 802. This Article focuses on Fourth
Amendment "seizures" of students.
14 See infra notes 244-257 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "several courts
have, post-Graham, still described a student's right to be free from excessive force in terms of
substantive due process" and noting that one "circuit has applied the Fourth Amendment to a
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teacher's use of force against a student"). In Koch, however, the Ninth Circuit did not decide
whether the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment applied to the use of force by a school official,
because the force used was so egregious that it violated the standards of either amendment. /d.
at 1303.
One of the few decisions applying the Fourth Amendment to school officials' use of force
against students is Wallace ex. rel Wallace v. 'Batavia School District, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir.
1995):
We thus hold that, in the context of a public school, a teacher or administrator who
seizes a student does so in violation of the Fourth Amendment only when the restriction of liberty is unreasonable under the circumstances then existing and apparent. Therefore, in seeking to maintain order and discipline, a teacher or
administrator is simply constrained to taking reasonable action to achieve those
goals. Depending on the circumstances, reasonable action may certainly include
the seizure of a student in the face of provocative or disruptive behavior.
After determining that the use of force was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ("Seventh Circuit") also held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not afford the student "any greater protection than the Fourth Amendment
from unwarranted discipline while in school." /d. at 1015.
In 1977, the Supreme Court, in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977), examined
the procedural due process protections students have when they receive corporal punishment,
briefly mentioning the Fourth Amendment:
The right of personal security is also protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . . It
has been said of the Fourth Amendment that its overriding function ... is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State. But
the principal concern of that Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is with intrusions on privacy in the course of criminal investigations. (The students] do not contend that the Fourth Amendment applies, according to its terms, to corporal punishment in public schools.
/d. (citations omitted). Even though the Supreme Court in its 1985 decision, New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), applied the Fourth Amendment to searches occurring within public
schools for violations of school rules, several courts have nevertheless interpreted the dicta in
Ingraham as precluding application of the Fourth Amendment to students' corporal punishment
claims. See, e.g., Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) (concluding without analysis
that "the paddling of recalcitrant students does not constitute a fourth amendment search or
seizure"); Gaither v. Barron, 924 F. Supp. 134, 135 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (briefly referring to
Ingraham's statement that the principal concern of the Fourth Amendment was with "criminal
investigations"); Thrasher v. General Cas. Co., 732 F. Supp. 966, 971 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (stating
that the Seventh Circuit's limits on applying the Fourth Amendment and Ingraham's statement
did not require it to apply the Fourth Amendment to a student's claim that a teacher used excessive force to discipline him; also holding that material facts were in dispute as to whether the
force violated the student's personal security interests as safeguarded by the substantive due
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Thrasher court stated in dicta that,
although the student "was seized within the literal meaning of that term when he was pushed,
thrown or shoved against the chalkboard, this contact constitute(d) a de minimus level of imposition that does not warrant the invocation of Fourth Amendment protection." /d.
Only the Fifth Circuit, when examining the use of force by school officials under substantive
due process, has considered whether students might have available state tort remedies. See Fee,
900 F.2d at 808. The Fifth Circuit stated:
We harbor no opinion as to the severity of the student's injuries in this case. We
hold only that since Texas has civil and criminal laws in place to proscribe educators
from abusing their charges, and further provides adequate post-punishment relief
in favor of students, no substantive due process concerns are implicated because no
arbitrary state action exists.
/d. at 810. Under Supreme Court precedent, the presence of coextensive state law remedies,
however, is irrelevant to establishing whether a substantive due process violation has occurred.
See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (stating that "the Due Process Clause
contains a substantive component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful governmental ac-
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limiting the reach of substantive due process, now constitute "seizures"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 16 In examining personal security claims similar to those that students could pursue, the Supreme Court
has considered the Fourth Amendment when police intentionally use physical force during investigatory stops,t? arrests,18 and high-speed vehicular
chases, 19 and when police officers deprive a citizen of liberty by filing criminal charges against the citizen.20 Lower federal courts have also relied on the
Fourth Amendment, rather than the substantive due process component of
the Fourteenth Amendment, in evaluating police officers' use of physical
force against citizens.21
In recent years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when officials use physical force to "seize" a person, the Fourth Amendment, not the
Fourteenth Amendment, applies.22 It also recently explained that a prior decision based on substantive due process "today would be treated under the
Fourth Amendment, albeit with the same result."23
These decisions raise as many questions as they purport to answer-including why a person's interest in personal security must be "covered" by
tions ... regardless of any state·tort remedy that might be available to compensate ... for the
deprivation" (emphasis added)).
16 Although the Supreme Court and other federal courts have evaluated seizures of students under the Fourth Amendment if a search first occurred, most litigation involving the use of
force to control or discipline students in the absence of a preliminary search has occurred under
the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment. See infra note 12.
17 See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (police tackling suspect after be
tossed drugs while running); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (officials slamming
uncooperative suspect against car during investigation). For a discussion of these cases, see infra
text accompanying notes 140-146.
18 See Brower v. County of lnyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (using force by setting up a
roadblock to stop a fleeing motorist); Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (shooting fleeing
felon in the back); Wmston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (obtaining warrant to authorize
surgery to remove bullet from suspect); for a· discussion of these cases, see infra Part III.B.l.
19 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). For a discussion of this case, see
infra Part II.E.2.
20 See, e.g., Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that
"pretrial restrictions on travel and required attendance at court bearings constitute a seizure").
But see Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 343 (5th Cir. 1999) (Jones, J., concurring) (stating that
"circuit courts are divided both on the application of the Fourth Amendment post-arraignment
and on whether mere requirements of the posting of a bond and appearance at pretrial hearings,
without more, constitute a 'seizure"'). See generally Andrew G. Ferguson, Continuing Seizure:
Fourth Amendment Seizure in Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Cases, in 15 NAT'L LAWYERS
GuiLD CIVIL LIBERTIES CoMM. CIVIL RIGIITS LmGATION & ArroRNEY FEES HANDBOOK 4-1,
4-7 to 4-26 (Steven Saltzman, ed. 1999) (summarizing how U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have examined the application of the Fourth
Amendment to malicious prosecution claims).
21 See infra Part III.B.2. See generally MICHAEL A VERY ET AL., PoLICE MiscoNDucr LITIGATION § 2.14-2.18 (3d ed. 1998) (summarizing numerous Fourth Amendment unreasonable
force claims brought against police officers).
22 See, e.g., Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844; United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997);
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 276 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
23 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849 n.9. The Court reframed Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952) as a Fourth Amendment case. Rochin had held that police officers, who forced a suspect
to swallow an emetic after he swallowed drugs, engaged in conscience shocking conduct that
violated the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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only a single amendment. In light of the Court's doctrinal structure requiring
only one constitutional source, this Article advocates evaluating the constitutionality of school officials' uses of force under the Fourth Amendment, not
the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24
Part II begins with an historical perspective, revealing that courts initially examined all physical force claims under a single standard, without
specifying the constitutional amendment providing this protection. Federal
courts of appeal traditionally applied the four "Glick factors" that Justice
Friendly created in 1973:25 (1) the need for the force, (2) the relationship
between the need and the amount of force, (3) the extent of injury, and (4)
the presence of malicious intent to harm. 26 From 1978 to 1998, the Supreme
Court began to limit these factors as it evaluated the constitutionality of offi24 In analyzing the scope of substantive due process, several courts have contrasted school
officials' use of physical force to discipline students with the abuse of officials' power to sexually
abuse or harass students. See, e.g., Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the "extent of harm inflicted by sexual abuse is immeasurable" and adding that "in
contrast to corporal punishment, sexual abuse is never inflicted in 'good faith'"); Stoneking v.
Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that "[a] teacher's sexual
molestation of a student is an intrusion of the schoolchild's bodily integrity not substantively
different for constitutional purposes from corporal punishment by teachers" with respect to putting school official on notice that their sexual behavior violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
Similarly, when police officers use force to assault a person sexually, courts continue to
apply the Fourteenth and not the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620,
628 (4th Cir. 1997). In Jones, a woman claimed that a police officer, after giving her a warning
for an alleged traffic offense, raped her before he drove her home. !d. at 622. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth Circuit") applied the Fourteenth Amendment:
Because the harm inflicted did not occur in the course of an attempted arrest or
apprehension of one suspected of criminal conduct, . . . the claim was not one of a
Fourth Amendment violation, but of the violation of the substantive due process
right under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under
color of state law to the wanton infliction of physical harm.
Id. at 628. For a similar analysis, see United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,262 (1997) (discussing
a district court's analysis of a state court judge's alleged sexual assaults under the Fourteenth
Amendment and quoting jury instruction that framed the issue as whether the conduct was
"shocking to one's consci[ence]").
25 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). For discussion of these factors, see
infra Part II.E.2.
26 See, e.g., Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980). Hall noted the parallel between its standard for evaluating police brutality claims and whether school officials used excessive force:
As in the cognate police brutality cases, the substantive due process inquiry in
school corporal punishment cases must be whether the force applied caused injury
so severe, was so disproportionate to the need presented, and was so inspired by
malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it
amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the
conscience.
/d. (citing Glick, 481 F.2d at 1033). Other courts have also applied the Glick factors to claims
involving school officials' hitting of students. See, e.g., Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist. 855 F.2d
650, 564 (8th Cir. 1988). In Wise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ("Eighth
Circuit") stated:
We believe that a substantive due process claim in the context of disciplinary corporal punishment is to be considered under the following test: 1) the need for the
application of corporal punishment; 2) the relationship between the need and the
amount of punishment administered; 3) the extent of injury inflicted; and 4)
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cials using physical force in a variety of contexts.27 These decisions resulted
in the Court enunciating the Graham rule (only one constitutional amendment applies to the use of physical force) and in limiting certain Glick factors
to specific amendments.28
Consequently, under current law, the Fourth Amendment articulates an
"unreasonable" standard and applies to persons "seized" within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment;29 the Eighth Amendment has a judicially created
"malice" standard and applies only to prisoners;30 and the Fourteenth
Amendment has a judicially created "shocks-the-conscience" standard that
applies to all other persons who are not "seized" and who are not prisoners.31
Part III focuses on how the Court moved the Fourth Amendment into
consideration when it examined searches in the public schools.32 To protect
students' interest in personal security, this section also argues for applying
the Fourth Amendment to school official's use of physical force.
Part III also examines the two types of force used by school officials that
constitute Fourth Amendment seizures: force used to control students and
force employed to punish students. When school officials grab students who
are fighting, their actions are similar to police officers trying to control unruly
whether the punishment was administered in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
Id. The WISe Court stated that, even if the coach had maliciously paddled the student, the hitting
did not 'rise to the level of a substantive due process violation." Id. (The coach hit the student
on the buttocks twice with a wooden paddle, causing the buttocks to become "reddened and
slightly bruised." !d.)
27 See LewiS, 523 U.S. at 842-43 (holding that only the Fourteenth Amendment applies and
explicitly refusing to apply the Fourth Amendment to a police officer's accidental hitting of a
motorcycle passenger with his police cruiser, after he chased the fleeing driver of a motorcycle);
Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95 (explicitly refusing to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to police
officers' use of physical force during an investigatory stop and declaring that only the Fourth
Amendment applies); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (applying the Fourth
Amendment to officers using a roadblock to stop a fleeing motorist); Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985) (evaluating a police officer's shooting of a fleeing felon under the Fourth
Amendment).
28 See infra Part II.D-E.
29 See, e.g., LewiS, 528 U.S. at 842-50 (holding that the Fourth Amendment's unreasonableness standard did not apply because police officer's accidental hitting of a fleeing motorist
with his cruiser was not a seizure); Graham, 490 U.S. at 398-99 (vacating and remanding because
lower court erroneously included malice as an inquiry under the Fourth Amendment's unreasonableness standard); Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-22 (holding that police officer's intentional shooting
of a fleeing unarmed burglary suspect was an unreasonable seizure). For a discussion of these
cases, see infra Part II.E.2.
30 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992) (holding that prisoners must prove under the
Eighth Amendment that prison guards acted maliciously in using force to discipline them and
that the force used was not "de minimus"); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1985) (holding that, in the context of subduing a riot, the presence or absence of malice is the appropriate
standard for evaluating the constitutionality of prison guards' use of force).
31 LewiS, 523 U.S at 847-49. For a discussion of this case, see infra Part II.E.2.
32 See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (holding that school
officials' drug testing of athletes was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment); New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-43 (1985) (applying the Fourth Amendment to school officials' search of student's purse to discover cigarettes). For a discussion of these cases, see infra
Part III.A.
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citizens-this use of force is a Fourth Amendment seizure. But, when school
officials use force to punish students, the analogy of their actions to police
officers is less clear. Nevertheless, such force constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure because it remains an intentional acquisition of physical control
over students.
The Article concludes by noting that applying the Fourth Amendment to
the intentional use of physical force by school officials does not unduly restrict school personnel in exercising their duties. The Fourth Amendment
allows school officials significant discretion in determining reasonable educational policies, including the potential use of force. Nevertheless, these policies must be reasonable in order to safeguard students' Fourth Amendment
interest in personal security.

II.

The History of Physical Force Litigation: Moving to Identify a
"Single" Constitutional Amendment

The history of physical force litigation reveals a fascinating path that has
narrowed with each passing decade. In the 1970s, shortly after the birth of
vigorous constitutional tort litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,33 suspects, pretrial detainees, prisoners, and students sued governmental officials, alleging
that the force used against them was unconstitutional. 34 In considering these
claims, courts often did not explicitly specify what constitutional provisions
that the officials may have violated. Instead, courts and juries usually measured the constitutionality of force by considering the four common-sense
Glick factors: the need for force, the relationship between the need and the
amount, the extent of injury, and the official's good or bad faith. 35 In sharp
contrast, courts today, adhering to more recent Supreme Court precedent,
must evaluate the right to personal security only under the single amendment
that applies to the specific factual situation litigated--either the Fourth,
Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment. 36
Although the Court characterizes its constitutional force decisions as being neatly rooted in either textual or historical analysis of a particular amendment, ultimately the Court has simply balanced a variety of interests. On one
side of the scale is the injured person's interest in personal security; on the
other side is society's interest in effective law enforcement, discipline, or con33 See, e.g., lA MARTIN A. ScHWARTZ & JoHN E. KIRKLIN, SEcriON 1983 LITIGATION:
CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1.1 at 3 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that Section 1983 constitutional tort
litigation "lay relatively dormant prior to 1961"); see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the
Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 567 (2000) (noting that the
expansion of liability for police officers is due to the Supreme Court's broad state action doctrine: "The modern reading of the Bill of Rights as a comprehensive regulation of the conduct of
government officers is possible only because of the Court's expansive redefinition of officer misconduct as a form of government action. Officer misconduct was not viewed as government
illegality at the time of the framing.").
34 See, e.g., Kathryn R. Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to
Personal Security under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State Officials in Violation
of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51 ALB. L. REv. 173, 204-29 (1987).
35 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the federal courts' evaluation of personal security
claims under these provisions).
36 See infra text accompanying notes 139-153.
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trol. One may also link the individual's interest in personal security to society's interest in preventing unnecessary governmental force: safeguarding the
individual from force also protects society by checking governmental abuse.
The Supreme Court's decisions on physical force litigation under the
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments reveal both this implicit balancing of interests and the Court's rigid focus on selecting a single amendment to be the "right" source of protection. How the Court has balanced
interests and applied a single amendment has depended upon how it characterized a particular context: officials who use objectively unreasonable force
violate a "seized" individual's Fourth Amendment right; prison officials who
maliciously use force violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment right; and officials who use shocking force violate a person's substantive due process right
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
A.

The Common Law: Blackstone and the Development of the Historic
Glick Factors

The Fourth,37 Eighth,38 and Fourteenth39 Amendments protect a person's right to personal security, a right that is also protected at common
law.40 In describing a person's constitutional right to bodily integrity, the
Supreme Court has looked to the common law for guidance.41 Which
37 See, e.g., Wmston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (stating that the "Fourth Amendment
generally protects the 'security' of 'persons"'); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968) (stating
that"[e]ven a limited search of the outer clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and
perhaps humiliating e"1'erience").
38 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977) (stating that "in addressing the
scope of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, this Court has
found it useful to refer to '[t]raditional common law concepts, ... and to the 'attitude[s] which
our society has traditionally taken.'") (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S 514, 535, 531 (1968)
(plurality opinion)).
39 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1998). In describing its
shocks-the-conscience standard for substantive due process claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Lewis Court explained that the common law protections for personal security
were broader than those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment:
It should not be surprising that the constitutional concept of conscience shocking
duplicates no traditional category of common-law fault, but rather points clearly
away from liability, or clearly toward it, only at the ends of the tort law's spectrum
of culpability. . . . [L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath
the threshold of constitutional due process .... It is, on the contrary, behavior at
the other end of the culpability spectrum that would most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by
any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to conscience-shocking level.
Id.
40 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). The Hodari Court examined
the common law:
We have long understood that the Fourth Amendment's protection against 'unreasonable ... seizures' includes seizure of the person . . . . For most purposes at
common law, the word ["seizure"] connoted not merely grasping, or applying physical force to, the animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it
\vithin physical control.
41 Both the Supreme Court and Fourth Amendment scholars have written volumes

12

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 69:1

amendment applies depends upon the circumstances surrounding the use of
force. In short, fact-specific analysis forms the core of modern constitutional
force litigation.

describing the common law and quarreling about its significance when interpreting the Fourth
Amendment's text. Professor Akhil Amar has been a strong proponent of interpreting the
Fourth Amendment to focus on whether the governmental action was reasonable. See AKHIL R.
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1998) (stating that "[w]henever ... [a warrantless] search or
seizure occurred, a jury, guided by a judge in a public trial and able to hear arguments from both
sides of the case, could typically assess the reasonableness of government action in an after-thefact tort suit"); AKHIL R. AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 2 (1997) (arguing that the "First Principle" of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness). In contrast, and
more traditionally, many scholars have interpreted reasonableness to presume the need for a
warrant. See Davies, supra note 33, at 557 n.9, 619-68 (listing extensive scholarly support for this
view and proceeding to criticize this perspective.) Most recently, Professor Davies contends that
scholars on both sides of the debate about the Fourth Amendment's historical meaning have
misinterpreted the historical evidence. !d. at 553-54 (arguing that there is a "lack of any actual
evidence of a broad reasonableness-in-the-circumstances standard in framing-era arrest and
search law" and also contending that the reason that "the Framers did not address warrantless
intrusions was that they did not anticipate that a wrongful act by an officer might constitute a
form of government illegality--rather, they viewed such misconduct as only a personal trespass
by the person who held the office").
Modern Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment no longer reiterate
that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment is the starting point for evaluating whether
searches and seizures are constitutional. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton. 526 U.S. 295, 299-300
(1999) (citations omitted). The Houghton Court articulated a two-part inquiry:
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates [the Fourth
Amendment], we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful
search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed ....
Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure under
traditional standards of reasonableness by assessing, on the one hand, the .:Iegree to
which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy <•nd, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
!d. See also Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (stating "[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be
construed in light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted,
and in a manner in which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens") (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)); Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). The Vernonia Court also focused on the common
law:
Where there was no clear practice, either approving or disapproving the type of
search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard "'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests."'
!d. (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Ex' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989), which quoted Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). In contrast, the Court, in a per curiam decision, has recently
restated the traditional presumption for warrants. See Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13
(1999) (per curiam) (stating "[a] warrantless search by the police is invalid unless it falls within
one of the narrow and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement" (citing Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Further examination of the disputes among the Court
and scholars as to the need for a warrant is not necessary for the purposes of this Article because
the use of force by school officials, like the use of force by police officers, rarely implicates a
need for a warrant. But see Winston, 470 U.S. at 767 (holding unreasonable a judicial order
authorizing surgery to remove a bullet from a suspect).
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The Common Law

The Court has used the common law as an important, but not dispositive, factor in evaluating two issues: (1) determining which amendment applies to the force used by governmental officials and (2) assessing the
constitutionality of force under the amendment selected.
The Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provide that no person shall be deprived of "liberty" without due process of
law.42 The Supreme Court has interpreted the word "liberty" to include the
common law's protection of bodily integrity: "Among the historic liberties so
protected was a right to be free from and to obtain judicial relief, for unjustified intrusions on personal security."43 The Court has observed that the
Fourth and Eighth Amendments44 also safeguard this liberty interest: "[t]he
right to personal security is . . . protected by the Fourth Amendment [and
Eighth Amendment], which [were] made applicable to the States through the
Fourteenth because its protection was viewed as 'implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty . . . enshrined in the history and basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples."'45
In his Commentaries, Blackstone described how the common law protected personal security in a variety of ways.46 For example, under the common law, police officers had a right to shoot fleeing felons, but not fleeing
misdemeanants.47 After determining that the act of intentionally killing a
suspect was a Fourth Amendment seizure,48 the Supreme Court nevertheless
refused to use this common law rule to define the scope of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.49 Instead it has more broadly protected the right to
personal security than the common law's strict rules by recognizing changing
circumstances.50 The Court declared that "[b]ecause of sweeping change in
legal and technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in this case
would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry."51 It rejected the common law rule, in part, because police departments had begun to refrain from using deadly force against fleeing felons. 52
The Court, however, candidly noted that state statutes did not reveal a "constant or overwhelming trend away from the common-law rule." 53
42
43

U.S. CoNsr. amend. V & XIV, § 1.
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKsroNE, COMMENTARIES *134).
44 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (incorporating the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments against the states).
45 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673 n.61 (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)).
46 4 WILLIAM BLACKsrONE, CoMMENTARIES *289.
47 See Tennessee v. Gamer, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *289).
48 Garner, 471 U.S. at 7.
49 Id. at 13.
so !d.

51 Id.
52 Id.

at 18 (noting that "[o]verwhelmingly, [police department policies] are more restrictive than the common law rule).
53 Id.
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Blackstone also described personal security as a procedural liberty interest that individuals possess when governmental officials inflict "punishment. "54 In determining which amendment applies in personal security
litigation, the Court has linked this procedural interest in liberty to the particular factual context. 5 5 Under the Eighth Amendment, a predeprivation hearing must occur before the government can inflict any criminal
"punishment";56 but, under the Fourteenth Amendment, such a hearing may
not always be necessary.57
The difference between the procedural protections now constitutionally
required depends upon which common law rule the Court applied. The common law protected all individuals subject to criminal process.58 The common
law also distinguished the force used against school children from that used
against prisoners. 59 The Court, in Ingraham, cited Blackstone for the proposition that even though an individual had an "absolute right[ ] . . . to
security from the corporal insults of menace, assaults, beating, and wounding,
. . . [it was not] a 'corporal insult' for a teacher to inflict 'moderate correction' on a child in his care."60 The common law permitted force against a
child by a teacher if it was "'necessary to answer the purposes for which [the
teacher] is employed." 61 In that circumstance, hitting was "'justifiable or
lawful.' " 62
The common law privilege to strike a child also depended upon parental
permission. 63 The modem Court rejected this aspect of the common law
when it allowed teachers to strike students even absent parental consent. 64
State law, for the Court, sufficiently protected schoolchildren's procedural liberty interests, because that law provided all the "process" due under
the Due Process Clause. 65 State law afforded students an opportunity to sue
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134.
See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (stating that "[t]he prisoner and
the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal
conviction and incarceration.").
56 !d. at 667.
57 !d. at 664.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (noting that "the balance struck
by the common law in generally authorizing felony arrests on probable cause, but without a
warrant, has survived substantially intact"; also adding that "[i]t appears in almost all of the
States in the form of express statutory authorization").
59 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682.
60 !d. at 661 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *134).
61 ld. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *453).
62 Id. (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *453).
63 See generally Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661-62 (noting that "[a]Ithough the early cases
viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving from the parents, the concept of parental delegation has been replaced by the view-more consonant with compulsory education laws-that the
State itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 'for the proper
education of the child and for the maintenance of group discipline"') (quoting 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, LAw OF ToRTS§ 3.20, 292 (1956)); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 471 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 681
n.1 (1995) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "although children may have had fewer rights
against the private schoolmaster at the time of the framing than they have against public school
officials today, parents plainly had greater rights then than now").
64 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 661 n.22 (citing Baker v. Owens, 423 U.S. 907 (1975)).
65 !d. at 672.
54

55
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for school officials' actions after officials had deprived the students of their
bodily integrity interests.66
The procedural protections for liberty thus vary: criminals get
predeprivation process but students get only postdeprivation process. In justifying this distinction, the Court noted that "the Framers of the Eighth
Amendment could not have envisioned our present system of public and
compulsory education, with its opportunity for noncriminal punishments."67
To apply the Eighth Amendment to students' punishments would be to
"wrench the Eighth Amendment from its historical context" focused on criminal punishment.6s
The Ingraham Court also considered policy reasons for not applying the
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishments to
schoolchildren.69 Looking to the practices of the states and professionals, it
stated: "Professional and public opinion is sharply divided on the practice [of
school teachers hitting students for punishment], and has been for more than
a century. Yet we can discern no trend toward its elimination."70 Similarly, it
found that other checks existed to prevent abusive practices: (1) public
schools are open and subject to scrutiny by the community,71 (2) the community may also supervise the schools,72 (3) students may sue school officials
under state tort law,?J and (4) the state may criminally prosecute physically
abusive school officials.74
As it defined the scope of Eighth Amendment constitutional rights, the
Court considered modem practices as well as common law rules. The Court
limited the common law rule both as applied to police officers' use of deadly
force and teachers' use of force to punish children.75 The Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence emphasizes modem practices by applying "evolving standards of decency" 76 to determine whether criminal punishments are
constitutional.77
66

Id. at 677. The Ingraham Court stated:
If the punishment inflicted is later found to have been excessive-not reasonably
believed at the time to be necessary for the child's discipline or training-the
school authorities inflicting it may be held liable in damages to the child and, if
malice is shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties.

Id.

67

Id. at 668.
Id. at 669.
69 Id. at 670-71.
70 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660-61 (1977).
71 Id. at 670.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 677.
74 Id.
75 See supra Part II.A.l.
76 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), quoted in Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 668 n.36.
77 More recently, Justices have sharply disagreed as to whether modern practices are relevant in defming the scope of protection under the substantive due process component of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Compare County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998)
(considering "contemporary practices") with id. at 860 (Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment)
(considering "'our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices"' (quoting Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 703, 720-22 (1997)). For example, in 1998, the Court stated that whether
officials violated substantive due process depends both on the "history of liberty protection" and
68
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The Court has employed the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to protect aspects of the common law interest in personal security.
Nevertheless, instead of viewing the right to personal security as an embodiment of a fundamental right protected by numerous provisions of the Constitution, the Court has narrowed and fractured the right to personal security by
selecting a single amendment for its coverage.78 Examination of the doctrinal
history of constitutional force litigation reveals this movement and its important consequences. To discern the Court's movement and its effects, one
must consider the foundational Glick79 factors and then examine the Court's
evaluation of them in different contexts.

2.

The Foundational Glick Factors

In Glick, decided in 1973, Judge Friendly of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit") described four factors for courts to
consider when determining the constitutionality of force:
[1] the need for the application of force, [2] the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, [3] the extent of injury inflicted, and [4] whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 80
Factors one and two simply question whether officials did anything impermissible. If the force used was just the "right" amount, then the official
would have committed neither a constitutional violation nor a state tort. The
third factor (the injury inflicted) raised a metaphorical and rhetorical question-does the force used "rise to the level of a constitutional violation?"
For example, as Judge Friendly noted, an impermissible shove does not necessarily constitute a constitutional violation, even if the amount of force used
was "unnecessary. " 81 Only the fourth factor created significantly different
interpretations for the federal courts of appeals: some courts viewed the facon "an understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the
standards of blame generally applied to them." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 848 n.8. Other justices similarly added that "history and tradition are the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point
of the substantive due process inquiry. There is room as well for an objective assessment of the
necessities of law enforcement ...." !d. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) Goined by Justice
O'Connor).
78 See infra Section II.
79 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
80 !d.
81 /d. The Supreme Court repeated this phrase in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
(1992), as it distinguished a constitutional cause of action from a state tort claim. The Hudson
Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment not to require that prisoners prove a significant injury: "the absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does
not end it." /d. at 7. The Court discerned two components to an Eighth Amendment personal
security claim: a subjective component, which requires proof of malice, and an objective component, which is "contextual and responsive to 'contemporary standards of decency.'" /d. at 8
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). The Court explained: "When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency
always are violated." /d. at 9.
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tor as a "requirement" for a constitutional violation; others interpreted it
simply as a relevant, but not necessary, inquiry.82
When the Supreme Court interpreted the constitutionality of force
under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, it interpreted all
amendments as considering the first three factors. 83 The Court treated differently the fourth factor, malice: the presence of malice became the sole inquiry under the Eighth Amendment;84 the sole inquiry under the substantive
due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment in certain circumstances;85 and an impermissible requirement under the Fourth Amendment in
all circumstances.86
In 1977, the Supreme Court cited the Glick decision when, in Ingraham
v. Wright,87 it ruled out applying the Eighth Amendment to school officials'
use of force. The Court discussed personal security in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. Examination of Ingraham
demonstrates the Court's dramatic shift in its understanding of the right of
personal security.
B.

Relying on State Law to Remedy Injury to Students' Personal Security
Interests

The Supreme Court's 1977 decision in Ingraham 88 is both similar to and
different from modem personal security litigation. It is similar to modem
litigation in its refusal to apply the Eighth Amendment to personal security
claims raised by school children, holding that the Eighth Amendment applies
to prisoners, not to students.89 But, in sharp contrast to modem litigation,
and despite its utterance that students have a "strong interest" in personal
security, the Ingraham Court undervalued students' interests in bodily integrity.90 The link between Ingraham-now a 1977 relic-and modem personal
security litigation is the Court's repeated consideration of contemporary
views in assessing the constitutionality of officials' use of force. 91
82 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, The Constitutionality of High-Speed Pursuits Under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments, 35 ST. Lou1s U. L.J. 205, 209 n.l4 (1991) (collecting cases).
83 See infra text accompanying notes 138, 167, 198-221.
84 See infra Part II.E.l.
85 See infra Part III.E.2.
86 See infra text accompanying notes 138-142.
87 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.38 (1977).
ss Id.
89 Id. at 670-71.
90 Id. at 676.
91 In Ingraham, the Court intertwined its discussion of common-law educational practices
with contemporary views on corporal punishment. Before the Revolution, "public and compulsory education existed in New England, . . . but the demand for free public schools as we now
know them did not gain momentum in the country as a whole until the mid-1800's." ld. at 660
n.14. Not until1918 did public compulsory education exist throughout the nation. Id.
The common law allowed a private school master to "inflict 'moderate correction' on a child
in his care," id. at 661 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *134), and the
master's authority was derivative of the parent's authority to discipline a child. ld. at 662. Nevertheless, Blackstone described the common law as establishing an individual's "'absolute
right[] . . . to security from the corporal insults of menace, assaults, beating, and wounding."'
[d. at 661 (quoting 1 WLLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134).
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The setting of Ingraham's story is a Florida junior high school in 1970,
thirty years ago. 92 Two students, James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews,
challenged schools officials' physical punishment of them. 93 Ingraham alleged that because he was being disruptive in a class, Principal Wright stated
that he would hit him five times with a wooden paddle.94 When Ingraham
refused "to assume a paddling position," two assistant principals grabbed Ingraham and Principal Wright hit him twenty times. 95 Ingraham then sought
medical attention: he took painkillers for a large bruise, he used cold compresses to reduce swelling, and did not attend school for ten days because
was unable to sit. 96 The pain persisted for three weeks. 97
Andrews alleged that school officials had hit him on two different occasions.98 When he refused to submit to the paddle, believing that he had not
violated a school rule, an assistant principal "struck him on the arm, back,
and across the neck." 99 He also alleged that on another occasion Principal
Wright had paddled him on the back and wrist because he broke some glass
during a sheet metal class. 100 He too visited a doctor; his pain lasted one
week. 101
The students alleged that school officials' hitting of them violated the
substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "Cruel and Unusual Punishments,"
and the procedural due process afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. 102
When the Supreme Court considered Ingraham, it granted review only of the
Eighth Amendment and procedural due process claims 103 and rejected reThe Ingraham Court also considered how current society's practices differed from the common law. With the advent of compulsory education, public school officials acquired authority
beyond that permitted by parents in order to fulfill their "custodial and tutelary" powers.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 336 (1985), the Supreme Court explained this expansion of state power: "Today public
school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual
parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary
policies."
The Ingraham Court noted that the nation had abandoned the common law practice of
corporal punishment for criminals and opined that "professional and public opinion is sharply
divided on the practice [of corporal punishment] and has been for more than a century."
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660-61. Corporal punishment was "recognized in the laws of most States,"
and there was "no trend toward its elimination"-at least in 1977. /d. at 676.
Contemporary views of corporal punishment are quite different. See infra note 117. The
trend is now in the other direction-towards its abandonment. See infra note 117.
92 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653.
93 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 653 (1977).
94 Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
95
96

97
98
99
100

/d.
/d.

/d.
/d.
/d.

Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 911 (5th Cir. 1976), affd, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).

/d.
102 /d. at 911-12.
101

103 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659 (1977).
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view of the substantive due process claim,104 noting that the students had not
raised the Fourth Amendment as an. alternate source of protection.l05
The Court's refusal in Ingraham to apply the Eighth Amendment to the
students' claims resembles modern decisions that limit the Eighth Amendment to prisoners' claims for brutality, by narrowly construing the Amendment's scope. 106 Its procedural due process analysis, however, seems dated,
reflecting that the Court wrote on the legal slate of 1977. In Ingraham, the
Court ruled that state-law remedies provided adequate process, even though
students could seek protection only after school officials hit them; 107 since
Ingraham, the Court has enunciated the general rule that predeprivation process is necessary before depriving a person of liberty. 108
1.

The Eighth Amendment Does Not Apply to School Punishments

Even though hitting students for their misbehavior constitutes "punishment" under any definition of the word,1° 9 the Supreme Court in Ingraham
did not textually link this type of punishment to the Eighth Amendment's
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments" Clause. 110 Instead it relied on its historical interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as applying to punishments for
criminal convictions. 1 11
In rejecting the Eighth Amendment as a basis for the students' personal
security claims, the Court stated that school children are not prisoners.112
One important difference for the Court was the 1970s view of corporal punishment as applied to prisoners and to students:
Despite the general abandonment of corporal punishment as a
means of punishing criminal offenders, the practice continues to
Id. at 689 n.12.
Id. at 673 n.42.
106 See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1992) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment to require prisoners to prove that officials' maliciously used physical force, whether to stop
a riot or to control prisoners one-on-one).
107 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676-82.
108 See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (stating that "the Court usually
has held that the Constitution requires some kind of hearing before the State deprives a person
of liberty or property").
109 See, e.g., MuRRAY A. STRAus, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 8 {1994). Professor Straus noted that the language we use often
influences how we view an act: a parent "hitting" a child sounds different from a parent "spanking" a child. Id. Both hitting and spanking are violent behavior, although each has different
connotations. Id.
110 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670 n.39 (stating that "the Court has never held that all punishments are subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny").
111 Id. at 667 (stating "[i]n light of this history, it is not surprising to find that every decision
of this Court considering whether a punishment is 'cruel and unusual' within the meaning of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments has dealt with a criniinal punishment" (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962);
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion); Louisiana ex rei Francis v. Resweber, 329
U.S. 459 (1947); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126
(1903); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879); Pevear v.
Commonwealth, 5 Wall. [72 U.S.] 475 (1867)).
112 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669.
104

105
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play a role in the public education of schoolchildren in most parts of
the country. Profession and public opinion is sharply divided on the
practice, and has been for more than a century. Yet we can discern
no trend toward its elimination. 113
In the 1970s, criminal punishments-except for the death penalty-did not
include punishment to prisoners' bodies,l1 4 but school punishments still include the inflicting of bodily pain. 115
The Court also employed "contemporary approval of a reasonable corporal punishment" 116 to support its conclusion that school officials need not
provide students with a hearing before hitting them as punishment. The Ingraham Court's state-by-state survey of current practices 117 is similar to the
!d. at 660-61 (footnotes omitted).
Although the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), altered death
penalty jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment, many states then "hurriedly passed replacement death-penalty statutes." James Acker, Robert Bohm & Charles S. Lanier, Introduction, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 7 (James Acker, et al. eds. 1998)
(noting that, as of publication, thirty-eight states have death penalty statutes).
115 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 660.
116 !d. at 663.
111 The Court's summary of state statutes and practices in the 1970s differs dramatically
from state statutes and practices in 2000. The Ingraham Court stated:
Of 23 States that have addressed the problem through legislation, 21 have authorized the moderate use of corporal punishment in public schools. Of these States
only a few have elaborated on the common-Jaw test of reasonableness, typically
providing for approval or notification of the child's parents, or for infliction of punishment by the principal or in the presence of an adult witness.
Only two States, Massachusetts and New Jersey, have prohibited all corporal punishment in their public schools. Where the legislatures have not acted, the state
courts have uniformly preserved the common-law rule permitting teachers to use
reasonable force in disciplining children in their charge.
!d. at 662-63.
In contrast to the 1970s, when only two states prohibited teachers from hitting students as a
means of discipline, today nineteen states and the public charter schools in the District of Columbia expressly forbid its use. ALASKA ADMIN. CooE tit. 4, § 07.010(c) (2000); CAL. Eouc.
CooE § 49001 (West 1993); HAw. REV. STAT.§ 3024-1141 (1998-99); 105 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5/24-24, 5/34-84a (West 1998); IowA CooE ANN. § 280.21 (West 1999); Mo. CooE ANN.,
Eouc. § 7-306(a) (1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 71, § 37G (1996); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 380.1312 (West 1997); MINN. STAT. {l 121A.58 (Supp. 1999); MoNT. CooE ANN. § 20-4-302(3)
(1999); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-295 (1996); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. 392.4633 (Michie 1996); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 18A:6-1 (West 1999); OR. REv. STAT. § 339.250(8)(a) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
16 § 1161ac (Supp. 1999); VA. CooE ANN.§ 22.1-279.1 (Michie 1997); WAsH. REv. CooE ANN.
§ 28A.150.300 (West 1997); W. VA. CooE § 18A-5-1(d) (1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 188.31(2)
(West 1999); D.C. CooE ANN.§ 31-2817(f) (1998).
Fifteen states give to local school boards the discretion to decide whether to authorize corporal punishment as a means of discipline. ALA. CooE § 16-28A-1 (1995) ("Teachers are hereby
given the authority and responsibility to use appropriate means of discipline up to and including
corporal punishment as may be prescribed by the local board of education."); ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15-843(B), B(2) (West 1999) ("The governing board of any school district shall, in consultation with the teachers and parents of the school district, prescribe rules for the discipline,
suspension and expulsion of pupils. The rules shall include . . . [p]rocedures for the use of
corporal punishment if allowed by the governing board."); ARK. CooE ANN. § 6-18-505(c)(l)
(Michie 1999) ("Any teacher or school administrator in a school district that authorizes use of
wrporal punishment in the district's written student discipline policy may use corporal punish113

114
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ment, provided only that the punishment is administered in accord with the district's written
student discipline policy, against any pupil in order to maintain discipline and order within the
public schools."); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit 14, § 701(b) (1999) (stating that a teacher or administrator has "the same authority to ... control ... and to discipline the student . . . as a parent" may
exercise; adding that this "authority includes ... corporal punishment where deemed reasonable
and necessary" if administered "in accordance with the state or local board of education policy"); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 232.27(1), 10) (West 1998) ("Teachers and other instructional personnel shall have the authority to ... [u]se corporal punishment according to school board policy"
subject to certain additional statutory requirements.); GA. CODE. ANN. § 20-2-730 (1996) ("All
area, county, and independent boards of education ... to determine and adopt policies and.
regulations relating to the use of corporal punishment."); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 158.444(1),
158.444(2)(b)(3) (Banks-Baldwin 1999) ("The Kentucky Board of Education shall promulgate
appropriate administrative regulations relating to . . . student discipline," and requiring that
school districts report to the Board the "number of suspensions, expulsions, and corporal punishments."); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17 416.1B (West Supp. 2000) ( "Each parish and city school
board shall have the discretion with respect to the use of corporal punishment."); Miss. CoDE
ANN.§ 37-11-57(2) (1999) (stating that school officials using corporal punishment do not commit
negligence if the hitting was in accordance with both federal law and the "rules or regulations of
the State Board of Education or the local school board"; also adding that civil liability occurs
only if any hitting was "in bad faith or with malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting a wanton and willful disregard of human rights or safety"); Mo. STAT. ANN. § 160.261(1) (West 2000)
("The local board of education of each school district shall clearly establish a written policy of
discipline, including the district's determination on the use of corporal punishment and the procedures in which punishment will be applied."); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-5-4.3A, 22-5-4.3B
(Michie 2000) ("Local school boards shall establish student discipline policies ... and [e]ach
school district discipline policy shall establish rules of conduct governing areas of student and
school activity, detail specific prohibited acts and activities and enumerate possible disciplinary
sanctions, which sanctions may include corporal punishment."); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-390,
115C-391 (1999) (stating that school officials may use reasonable force to correct pupils, providing some guidance for corporal punishment, and mandatory that local boards of education adopt
policies consistent with other laws regarding corporal punishment); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 3319.41 (Anderson 1999) (prohibiting corporal punishment unless the local school board specifically adopts a resolution permitting corporal discipline and forms a task force that will regularly study disciplinary procedure, develop written reports, and advise the board); S.C. CoDE
ANN. § 59-63-260 (Law. Co-Op. 1990) ("The governing body of each school district may provide
corporal punishment for any pupil that it deems just and proper."); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 21-4308(a)-(b) (Michie 1999) (stating that "[e]ach board of trustees in each school district ... may
adopt rules for reasonable forms of punishment and disciplinary measures" and insulating school
personnel from liability for inflicting reasonable corporal punishment authorized by school district policy).
Without specifically addressing corporal punishment, two states generally authorize school
boards to adopt rules for discipline. IDAHO CoDE§ 33-1224 (Michie 1995) ("It is the duty of a
teacher to carry out the rules and regulations of the board of trustees in controlling and maintaining discipline."); IND. CoDE ANN. § 20-8.1-5.1-3 (West 1995) (stating that "[i]n all matters
relating to the discipline and conduct of students, school corporation personnel stand in the
relation of parents and guardians to the students of the school corporation"; adding that "school
corporation personnel have the right ... to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote
student conduct that conforms with an orderly and effective educational system").
Eight states authorize school officials to use reasonable force to foster a safe and educational environment. CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-703(1)(a) (West 1998) ("A teacher or other
person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor, may use reasonable and appropriate
physical force ... when and to the extent it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to maintain
discipline or promote the welfare of the minor."); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18(6) (West
2001) (stating that a "teacher ... may use reasonable physical force upon [a] minor when and to
the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary" in four circumstances: to "protect himself or other from immediate physical injury"; to "obtain possession of a dangerous instrument
or controlled substance ... upon or within the control of such minor"; to "protect property from
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Court's modern personal security litigation under the Fourth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, which also considers contemporary practices.U 8

2.

Procedural Due Process Applies to School Punishments

In determining the kind of process necessary to protect students' interests in personal security, the Ingraham Court again looked to the common
law and to current state practices. It held that school officials do not violate
procedural due process when they fail to hold a pre-punishment hearing
before hitting students.1 19 Both the common law and modern 1970s practices
became tools for the Court to limit students' interests in personal security. 120
Even though the Court, in a backhanded way, recognized that hitting a
child involves a significant liberty interest, 121 it limited this interest by noting
physical damage"; and to "restrain such minor or remove such minor to another area, to maintain order"); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 106(2) (West 1996) ("A teacher ... is justified in
using a reasonable degree of force against any such person who creates a disturbance when and
to the extent that he reasonably believes it necessary to control the disturbing behavior or to
remove a person from the scene of such disturbance."); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 627:6(II) (1996)
("A teacher ... is justified ... in using necessary force ... when the minor creates a disturbance,
or refuses to leave the premises or when it is necessary for the maintenance of discipline."); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 35.10 (McKinney 1998) ("A teacher . . . may use physical force, but not deadly
physical force, upon [a person under twenty-one] when and to the extent that he reasonably
believes it necessary to maintain discipline or to promote the welfare of such person."); PA STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, §§ 509(2)(i), 509(2)(ii) (West 1998) (stating that "[t]he use of force upon or toward
the person of another is justifiable if . . . [t]he actor is a teacher or person otherwise entrusted
with the care or supervision for a special purpose of a minor and . . . the actor believes that the
force used is necessary to further such special purpose, including the maintenance of reasonable
discipline in a school, class or other group, and that the use of such force is consistent with the
welfare of the minor"; also adding that the force used must not exceed that allowed to parents
under state law); S.D. CoDIFIED LAws § 13-32-2 (Michie 1991) ("Superintendents, principals,
supervisors, and teachers and their aids and assistants, have the authority, to use the physical
force that is reasonable and necessary for supervisory control over students."); TEx. PENAL
CoDE ANN. § 9.62(1)-(2) (Vernon 1994) ("The use of force, but not deadly force, ... is justified:
(1) if the actor is entrusted with the care, supervision, or administration of the person for a
special purpose; and (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is necessary to further the special purpose or to maintain discipline in a group.").
Two states directly grant school officials the authority to use corporal punishment. OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 844 (West 1998) (stating that state law does not prohibit a "parent, teacher
or other person from using ordinary force as a means of discipline, including but not limited to
spanking, switching or paddling"); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 49-6-4103 (1996) (permitting any teacher
or principal to use corporal punishment in a reasonable manner to maintain discipline and
order).
One state-Utah-conditions the use of corporal punishment upon written consent by a
student's parent or guardian. UTAH CoDE ANN. § 53A-11-802(1) (1997).
One state-North Dakota-recently repealed its prior statute that had prohibited corporal
punishment. N.D. CENT. CoDE 15-47-47 (1999) (repealed).
Two states-Kansas and Rhode Island have not enacted a statute addressing the use of
force by school officials. See generally R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-12-3 (1956) ("Every teacher shall
aim to implant and cultivate in the minds of all children committed to his care the principles of
morality and virtue.")
118 See infra Part !I.E.
119 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682.
120 See supra text accompanying notes 109-116.
121 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 676. The Court described the student's interest in personal secur-
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that both the common law and modem practices allowed school officials to
inflict bodily punishment: "Were it not for the common-law privilege permitting teachers to inflict reasonable corporal punishment on children in their
care, and the availability of the traditional remedies for abuse, the case for
requiring advance procedural safeguards would be strong indeed." 122 The
Court also noted tha,t "[t]he concept that reasonable corporal punishment in
school is justifiable continues to be recognized in the laws of most States."123
Even though students have a "strong interest in procedural safeguards
that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment," 124 the Ingraham Court
found that Florida's state law-both civil and criminal-provided students
with sufficient process for purposes of the claim under consideration-the
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. 125 Because
it did not grant review of the students' substantive due process claim, the
Ingraham Court's procedural decision is narrow.
Although the Court's more recent personal security cases do not focus
on the personal security interests of students, they similarly indicate the
Court's attempt to confine the right to personal security within one amendment-in this case the Fourth Amendment-and further demonstrate its
consideration of modem practices in describing the scope of this right.

C.

Moving Personal Security Rights to the Fourth Amendment: Officers
Using Deadly Force

After the Ingraham decision in 1977, courts generally continued to define the scope of the substantive right to personal security by considering
Judge Friendly's common law Glick factors. 126 But, in 1985, the Supreme
Court, in Tennessee v. Garner, 127 moved its analysis of unconstitutional force
against citizens to the Fourth Amendment, and specifically linked police
shootings to this amendment, rather than to substantive due process.128
Under this Fourth Amendment analysis, two issues emerged: (1) whether the
shooting of a suspect constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure;129 and (2) if
ity as a "strong interest," but not one that outweighed the interests on the other side of the
balance. !d.
122 /d. at 674.
123 Id. at 677.
124 !d.
125 Id. The Court stated:
If the punishment inflicted is later found to have been excessive-not reasonably
believed at the time to be necessary for the child's discipline or training-the
school authorities inflicting it may be held liable in damages to the child and, if
malice is shown, they may be subject to criminal penalties.
Id. The Court's phrasing of the civil state Jaw remedy parallels its later Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, which has recognized a substantive right to be free from "unreasonable" force.
The Court's description of the criminal penalty parallels its Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process jurisprudence, which has recognized a substantive right to be free from the malicious
use of force. See infra Parts ill.2.C & E.
126 See supra Part II.A.2.
127 471 u.s. 1 (1985).
128 Id. at 7.
129 !d.

24

The George Washington Law Review

[Vol 69:1

so, whether the shooting was itself a constitutionally unreasonable seizure. 130
Under the facts of the case, the Court held that the shooting violated the
Fourth Amendment.131
With respect to the first question of whether the shooting was a seizure,
the Court described, without further analysis, the officer's intentional shooting of a fleeing burglary suspect as a Fourth Amendment "seizure." 132 Subsequent cases, however, have revealed that the Court's narrow definition of
"seizure" in this context, and its focus on selecting one amendment for personal security litigation133 has created a constitutional chasm between the
standards imposed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments: officials violate the Fourth Amendment by acting unreasonably, but they violate the substantive due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment only when
they commit shocking conduct.B4
In Garner, the Court declared "unreasonableness" to be the primary
standard for personal security litigation by focusing on the language of the
Fourth Amendment, which explicitly prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures." Yet, as the mass of Fourth Amendment debate and jurisprudence
indicates, "unreasonable" is hardly self-defining. The Court attempted to
clarify what unreasonableness means as applied to officers using deadly
force. In doing so, the Court balanced societal against individual interests:
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to
others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by
using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a
weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed
a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious
physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given. 135
The Court vigorously protected the suspect's interest in personal security by
determining that the Fourth Amendment barred officers from shooting all
fleeing felons, a practice that had been permitted at common law. 136 It
stated, "[t]he suspect's fundamental interest in his own life need not be elaborated upon." 137 Thus, the Court implicitly recognized that the first two
130 /d. at 9-12.
131 Id. at 11.
132 Id. at 7. The Court stated:
Whenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk away, he has seized
that person. . . . While it is not always clear just when minimal police interference
becomes a seizure, ... there can be no question that apprehension by the use of
deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
/d. (citations omitted). These few sentences constitute the Court's entire analysis of whether the
Fourth Amendment should apply to a police shooting.
133 For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the "rule of Graham," see supra Part II.D.
134 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842-46 (1998); see also infra Part II.E.2.
135 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12.
136 ld. at 12 (stating that the common law rule "allowed the use of whatever force was
necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, though not a misdemeanant").
137 Id. at 9.
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foundational Glick factors-the need for force and the amount of forcehelped to define the substantive right to personal security under the Fourth
Amendment. The extent of injury-in this case, the loss of the suspect's
life-outweighed the harm facing the officer or others unless the officer was
threatened with the infliction of serious physical harm. In contrast, the
Court's opinion implicitly rejected the fourth Glick factor-whether the officer acted maliciously, a factor later explicitly disregarded in Graham v.
Connor as being irrelevant to determining whether a particular seizure is
reasonable.138
D.

Applying Only the Fourth Amendment to "Seized" Persons: The
Graham Rule

Despite the Garner decision, some courts of appeal continued to apply
malice as a factor when evaluating the use of nondeadly force by police officers.139 In 1989, four years after Garner, the Supreme Court, in Graham v.
Connor, held that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ("Fourth
Circuit") erred when, in its evaluation of police officers' use of nondeadly
force, it merely considered whether malice, the fourth Glick factor, was present.140 The Court stated that the Fourth Circuit failed to understand that the
scope of the right to personal security depends upon the precise constitutional amendment at issue: although the Eighth Amendment imposes a malice standard for the use of force during a prison riot,141 inquiry as to whether
malice was present cannot even be a factor for a Fourth Amendment
claim.142 Police officers violate the Fourth Amendment by acting unreasonably-an objective, not subjective, issue.143 The Court articulated the doctrinally significant "Graham rule:" if police officers "seized" an individual by
using force, only the Fourth Amendment applies, not the substantive due
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. 144
138 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
139 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1987), rev'd 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
140

Graham, 490 U.S. at 399.

141 Graham, 490 U.S. at 398 n.11.
142 One scholar has aptly noted that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard is
not the objective reasonableness standard of "tort law negligence;" rather, the Fourth Amendment standard, as interpreted by courts, is "much more forgiving toward defendants." Barbara
E. Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy ofPaul v. Davis, 85 VA. L. REv. 569, 601-02
(1999). Professor Armacost contends, however, that a subjective standard has its "virtues" and
that "real loss [has been] occasioned by the Court's reallocation of excessive force claims from
the Due Process Clause to the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 607. I respectfully disagree. Proving
that an official's use of force was "shocking to the conscience" was, and remains, very difficult.
See supra note 12. Although Armacost's complaints with Fourth Amendment litigation are
sound, the problems she isolates are not with the Fourth Amendment itself or with its protections, but rather with how some courts have erroneously interpreted the scope of the protection
that the Fourth Amendment provides for the right of personal security. See Kathryn R.
Urbonya, Dangerous Misperceptions: Protecting Police Officers, Society, and the Fourth Amendment Right to Personal Security, 22 HAsTINGs CaNST. L.Q. 623,691-705 (1995) (listing nine ways
that courts have mistakenly limited the Fourth Amendment right to personal security).
143 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
144 Id. at 395.
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Under the rule of Graham, as later interpreted by the Court in 1997 and
1998 decisions, 145 prisoners similarly may assert a personal security claim
only under the Eighth Amendment. (The Graham opinion actually had not
so narrowly limited substantive due process; it stated that "substantive due
process" is "at best redundant of that provided by the Eighth
Amendment. ")146
Even though an objective reasonableness standard for the Fourth
Amendment is hardly surprising because it prohibits "unreasonable"
seizures, the Graham rule is unusual because it rejects substantive due process as an additional claim. 147 When either the Fourth or Eighth Amendment
applies to an individual's claim to personal security, the Graham rule declares substantive due process to be irrelevant, even though it also protects
personal security. In short, the Graham rule unmasks the Court's desire to
rein in substantive due process jurisprudence.148 The Court tried to justify
145 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). The Lewis Court quoted
with approval United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997):
Graham simply requires that if a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be
analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the
rubric of substantive due process.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843.
146 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10. Prior to Graham, the Court had similarly stated that
substantive due process, at least in the context of a prison riot, does not provide more protection
than does the Eighth Amendment. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
147 See Toni M. Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The Court's "Jot for Jot" Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1086, 1090-91 (1998) (stating that the rule of Graham is
an "analytical and doctrinal oddity," and has the potential to overrule the "Court's substantive
due process 'unenumerated rights' caselaw altogether). Professor Massaro notes that Graham
was actually a substantive due process case, which the Court transformed into a Fourth Amendment case. See id. He interpreted Graham as "another layer to the Court's resistance to any
new substantive due process claims." Id.
148 Through the years, many cases reveal the Justices, either together or individually, limiting substantive due process as a source for protection for different kinds of interests. One decision capturing well this movement away from substantive due process in the context of personal
security claims is Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). The Court granted review to determine
whether the alleged malicious criminal prosecution of an individual can violate substantive due
process. Id. at 275 (plurality opinion). The Court produced six different opinions, but only Justice Stevens Goined by Justice Blackmun) declared that substantive due process was the appropriate basis for this type of claim.
In Albright, the plaintiff, who was the subject of an arrest warrant for selling drugs, surrendered into custody and complied with a limit on his traveling outside the state. At a prelinlinary
hearing, a judge determined that the alleged selling of a powder that merely looked like cocaine
was not a state crime. In viewing these facts, Justice Rehnquist Goined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Ginsburg) stated that the Fourth Amendment applied to "pretrial deprivations of
liberty," but expressed no view as to whether the plaintiff's allegations stated a claim under the
Fourth Amendment. /d. at 274-75 (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia, in a separate opinion, reiterated his strong opposition to the Court employing substantive due process analysis when a
plaintiff alleges "unspecified" liberty interests have been harmed. /d. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg found that the restraint imposed upon Albright constituted a Fourth
Amendment seizure, and suggested that the basis of his claim may have been that the arresting
officer was responsible for "effectuating and maintaining" the seizure. /d. at 279 n.5 (Ginsburg,
J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Kennedy Goined by Justice Thomas) concurred in the judgment, opining that a malicious prosecution claim is one actually alleging a violation of procedural due process. Unlike Justice Scalia, however, Justice Kennedy interpreted the due process
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the rule by relying on the "text" of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments:
the Fourth Amendment, according to the Court, is "an explicit textual source
of constitutional protection against this sort of physical intrusive governmental conduct," 149 but the Fourteenth Amendment is "more generalized." 150
Notwithstanding its focus on finding the "correct amendment," the Court
found a place for substantive due process claims, stating in dicta that the Due
Process Clause protects detainees from "excessive force that amounts to
punishment." 151
Thus, application of the Graham rule centers on selecting a particular
amendment to employ to examine the constitutionality of physical force by
government officials. In other contexts, the Court has sometimes applied the
strict rule of only allowing a claim under "one-amendment"152-and someclause to protect more than the liberty interests specified in the Bill of Rights. I d. at 283 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Souter found the alleged injuries to be compensable under the
Fourth Amendment. He also explicitly discussed the Graham rule: substantive due process applies to "homeless substantial claims." Id. at 288 (Souter, J., concurring). In short, according to
Justice Souter, if no other amendment applies to the alleged conduct, substantive due process
will if the claim is "substantial." But only Justice Stevens Qoined by Justice Blackmun) viewed
the claim as falling within substantive due process. Id. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens viewed the Graham rule differently, noting that "[n]othing in Graham ... forecloses a
general due process claim when a more specific source of protection is absent or, as here, open
to question." Id. at 305. Justice Stevens' view of Graham is literally correct, but the progeny of
Graham reveals the Court's adoption of Justice Souter's view: substantive due process applies
only to "homeless substantial claims." See infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
The fear of finding "substance" in due process is also present in the Court's early discussions
of the "right to privacy." For example, Justice Douglas found a "right to privacy" "emanati[ng]"
from the "penumbras of the Bill of Rights," as the Court considered the constitutionality of a
state law that banned the use and distribution of contraceptives, even to married couples. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965). He explicitly tried to distinguish this "right to
privacy" from the much criticized economic substantive due process jurisprudence of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Justice Blackmon later found the "right to privacy" included an
interest in having an abortion, with this right rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's conception
of personal liberty. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Later, Justice O'Connor boldly
stated that the Court could interpret the word "liberty": "Liberty must not be extinguished for
want of a line that is clear." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (O'Connor
J., Kennedy J. & Souter J., joint opinion).
149 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
150 Id.
151 Jd. at 395 n.10.
152 See, e.g., Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 293 (1999) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, and not the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied to
an attorney's challenge to law enforcement officials' search of his briefcase while his client testified before a grand jury, making the attorney unavailable for consultation); United States v.
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (explaining that the Graham rule does not bar applying
substantive due process to constitutional claims related to physical abuse by government officials
when no other constitutional provision applies); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813
(1996) (stating that "the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of the laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment"): See generally City
of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 246 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (rejecting
view that procedural due process applies to the execution of criminal search warrants, and stating that "the majority's conclusion represents an unwarranted extension of procedural due process principles developed in civil cases into an area of law that has heretofore been governed
exclusively by the Fourth Amendment").
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times it has not. 153
Because it inconsistently applies the single amendment rule, the Court
has repeatedly had to explain what "the Graham rule" means. The short
version of the Court's long and frequent discussion of the Graham rule is that
substantive due process protection against physical force applies only when
another Amendment does not provide relief. In the October 1998 term, for
instance, the Court again explained the Graham rule: "[W]here another provision of the Constitution 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection,' a court must assess a plaintiff's claim under that explicit
provision and 'not under the more generalized notion of "substantive due
process.'" " 154 Thus, when a claim falls under either the Fourth Amendment
or Eighth Amendment, substantive due process does not apply, but if a claim
raises both a Fourth Amendment claim and a procedural due process claim
under either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, both amendments apply.
In short, the Court's distinctions simply reflect its strong movement away
from finding substance in the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment.155
153 See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 60 (1992) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applied to the removal of a person's trailer-home and rejecting the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that only the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause applied to this seizure).
In Soldal, the Court explicitly recognized that actions by governmental officials may violate
more than one constitutional provision:
Certain wrongs affect more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more
than one of the Constitution's commands. Where such multiple violations are alleged, we are not in the habit of identifying as a preliminary matter the claim's
"dominant" character. Rather, we examine each constitutional provision in turn.
Graham is not to the contrary. Its holding was that claims of excessive force should
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard, rather than
under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process test. We were guided
by the fact that, in that case, both provisions targeted the same sort of governmental conduct and, as a result, we chose the more explicit textual source of constitutional protection over the more generalized notion of substantive due process.
Surely, Graham does not bar resort in this case to the Fourth Amendment's specific
protection for "houses, papers, and effects" rather than the general protection of
property in the Due Process Clause.
/d. at 70-71 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also United States v. James Daniel
Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 51-52, 62 (1993) (holding that even if the government's ex
parte seizure of a home did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it violated the procedural due
process requirements of the Fifth Amendment): See generally Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 294
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (refusing to limit challenges of law enforcement search to a
single amendment: "If their conduct had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, there is no reason why such a violation would cease to exist just because they also
violated some other constitutional provision.").
154 Conn, 526 U.S. at 293 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 395).
155 Similarly, Justice Thomas and Chief Justice Rehnquist have questioned whether the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "should displace, rather than
augment, portions of the [Court's] equal protection and substantive due process jurisprudence."
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist). Justices Thomas and Scalia have also argued that only the Fourth Amendment should
apply when an individual challenges the process used by police officers in seizing property, and
not the procedural due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Perkins, 525 U.S.
at 246 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "the majority's conclusion represents an
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The Graham rule as applied to bodily integrity claims, however, is more
than merely a symbolic statement. It matters immensely to litigators for two
reasons. First, the Court has narrowly defined what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "seizure."156 If the alleged conduct does not constitute a
"seizure" of a person, then either the Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment
"cover" the alleged conduct. Second, because the current standards for
Eighth157 and Fourteenth158 Amendment personal claims are difficult to leap
over, plaintiffs seek to characterize purportedly unconstitutional uses of
physical force against them as covered by the more protective Fourth
Amendment. 159 (Ironically, in some contexts the Court has applied the same
standard for both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.) 160
A brief summary of the Court's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment personal security decisions reveals both a protection of governmental officials
when they need to make quick decisions161 and limitations on a person's interest in bodily integrity. In contrast, the Court's Fourth Amendment decisions mute, but do not obliterate, the tremendous deference to officials
typical in Eighth Amendment decisions,162 giving greater protection to personal security.
unwarranted extension of procedural due process principles into an area of law that has heretofore been governed exclusively by the Fourth Amendment").
156 See infra Part III.B.
157 See infra Part II.E.l.
158 See infra Part II.E.2.
159 See, e.g., Childress v. City of Arapaho, 210 F.3d 1154 (lOth Cir. 2000). In Childress,
police officers, knowing that a van contained two hostages, a woman and a child, "fired a total of
twenty-one rounds" at it "as it passed through an intersection." Id. at 1156. The officers shot the
woman in the "hip, leg, lungs, chest, arm and hand," and hit the child in "her chest, legs and
back." Id. The injured hostages alleged that the police officers "were grossly negligent, reckless
and even deliberately indifferent to their plight." I d. at 1158. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit ("Tenth Circuit") held that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard did
not apply because the officers "did not 'seize' [the hostages] within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment but rather made every effort to deliver them from unlawful abduction." I d. at 1157.
The shootings also did not violate the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth
Amendment because the officers did not intend to harm the hostages. I d. at 1158. The Childress
court relied on similar decisions from the Courts of Appeals from the First, Second, Fourth, and
Tenth Circuits. Id. at 1157 (collecting cases holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply
because no "seizure" occurs when police officers intentionally fired upon vehicles, causing injury
to hostages or bystanders).
160 See infra text accompanying notes 218-221.
161 See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1998) (rejecting a standard of deliberate indifference for a substantive due process claim that challenged the constitutionality of a high-speed pursuit causing death; stating that "a purpose of causing harm" is the
proper standard for both a police chase and a prison riot because "unforeseen circumstances
demand an officer's instant judgment"); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (stating
"[w]hether the prison disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption . . . 'prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to
maintain institutional security"') (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)); see also
infra Part II.E.
162 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). The Court described the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard as allowing "for the fact that police officers are
often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation." ld. at
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Applying the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to Claims by Prisoners
and "Nonseized" Persons
I.

Malice for Eighth Amendment Prisoners' Claims

The Eighth Amendment applies when prison guards use physical force
to control prisoners, whether during a minor cell disturbance163 or a prison
riot.l 64 In creating malice as the core inquiry, the Supreme Court unconvincingly stated that the text of the Eighth Amendment led it to recognize malice
to be the appropriate standard.l 65 Even some of the more conservative Justices thought that the Court's choice of this standard was misguided-they
would have instead opted for a deliberate indifference standard that also required demonstration of a significant injury. 166
In declaring this standard, the Court explicitly cited the Glick factors,
but it selected only one of them to serve as the core inquiry-the presence of
malice. 167 The Court still considered the other Glick factors as important,
but only as methods for determining the presence or absence of malice. 168
According to the Court, the need for force, the relationship between the
need and the amount of force, and the extent of injury may create an inference of malice. 169 The Court interpreted the third Glick factor-the extent
397. The Court also stated that officers' decisions to use force "must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." !d.
at 396.
163 See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
164 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-22 (1986). The Eighth Amendment does not, however, according to the Supreme Court, provide any protection for students when their teachers
hit them as punishment. See supra Part II.B.l. Even though attendance for school children is
mandatory, the Court in 1977 found a constitutional difference in the protection for students and
prisoners. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669-72 (1977). Twenty years later, the Lewis
Court ironically held that the protection available under the Eighth Amendment is at times
identical to the standard under the Fourteenth Amendment, the amendment that the courts of
appeal have applied to most corporal punishment claims raised by students. See supra note 12.
165 See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) ("The source of the intent requirement is
not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which bans only cruel and
unusual punishment."). The textual games that the Court has played under the Eighth Amendment have been amusing, but not persuasive. When the Court in Ingraham decided that the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to the corporal punishment that students received for disciplinary infractions, the constitutional text-forbidding "cruel and unusual punishments"-was not
prominent in the opinion. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672. And, unlike in some Fourth Amendment
cases, there was no searching through old dictionaries for illumination as to what the word "punishment" meant. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (considering both
old and modern dictionaries as an aid to define the meaning of a Fourth Amendment "seizure").
Instead, the Court relied on both the history of the Eighth Amendment and on policy reasons in
deciding who may seek its protection. See supra Part II.B.l.
166 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 24 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's application of
the Whitley malice standard to "all excessive force cases [under the Eighth Amendment], without regard to the constraints facing prison officials").
167 In both Hudson (a prison disturbance case) and Whitley (a prison riot case), the Court
explicitly quoted Glick's malice factor as the central legal question: "whether force was applied
in good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm." Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6 (quoting Glick, 481 F.2d at 1028 (2d Cir.
1973)); Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21.
168 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.
169 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 27.
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of injury-as not requiring a significant injuryP0 It also created two new
factors: "[1] the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them
and [2] any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." 171
These five factors apply whether prison guards used force during a riot or just
to control a particular prisoner. 172
Despite the Court's declaration in Wilson that the malice standard is implicit in the language of the Eighth Amendment, it nevertheless has created a
different standard under the Eighth Amendment for prisoners' bodily integrity claims related to medical care 173 and for conditions of confinement
claims. 174 In these related contexts, the standard is instead subjective deliberate indifference to serious bodily needs and security. 175 The Court also explicitly rejected Whitley's malice standard for conditions of confinement
claims under the Eighth Amendment in Wilson. 176 The Wilson Court focused
on the "constraints facing the official" as it determined that under the Eighth
Amendment a deliberate indifference, not a malice standard, applied to conditions of confinement claims. 177 These bodily integrity claims require a significant personal deprivation; use of force claims, even those that result in
only a de minimus injury, are actionable if th~ officials acted maliciously.l78
The Court boldly (if naively) stated: "The source of the intent requirement is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself,
See id.
In Whitley, the Court first articulated these additional factors, 475 U.S. at 321, and the
Hudson Court subsequently cited tllem. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
172 See id. at 6.
173 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
174 See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994) (applying Eighth Amendment to
prison officials' duty to protect prisoners from each other); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303
(1991) (applying tile Eighth Amendment to prisoner's claim challenging his conditions of
confinement).
175 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The Farmer Court defined this subjective deliberate indifference standard in its holding:
[A] prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confmement unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which tile inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
ld. It equated this subjective inquiry with the standard for criminal recklessness. ld. The
Farmer Court explicitly rejected an objective deliberate indifference standard, id. at 837, because
it equated objective deliberate indifference with civil rather than criminal recklessness: a person
is reckless under the civil law if tile person "acts or (if the person has a duty to act) fails to act in
tile face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be
known." Id. at 836. The Court emphasized the difference between objective and subjective
deliberate indifference: when determining subjective deliberate indifference, juries must decide
whether an official actually knew the consequences of action or inaction, even though a "reasonable person would have known." ld. at 843 n.8.
176 Wilson 501 U.S. at 302-03.
111 Id. at 303.
178 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10 (stating that tile Eighth Amendment "excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that tile use of force is not of a sort
'repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'") (quoting Whitley, 415 U.S. at 327, which quoted
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
170
171
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which bans only cruel and unusual punishment. . . . An intent requirement
is either implicit in the word 'punishment' or it is not." 179 The Court attempted to explain the oddity of one amendment requiring prisoners to prove
two different states of mind depending on the type of claim asserted, by emphasizing the nature of the balancing inquiry necessary to determining official misconduct. It declared, "'deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious
illness or injury' can typically be established or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison
staff or other inmates." 180 But when the Court had to describe the Eighth
Amendment standard for conditions affecting safety, it encountered the intersection of these standards: the malice standard for officials directly harming prisoners 181 versus the subjective deliberate indifference standard for
prisoners harming each other. 182
Even though the Court has superficially tied its standard to the history
of each amendment and to its view of constitutional text, underlying all these
decisions is an implicit balancing of interests. 183 This balancing of interests
also became the Court's foundation for substantive due process claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment.

2.

Balancing for Substantive Due Process Claims

In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Supreme Court for the first time
clearly articulated that "shocks the conscience" was the appropriate standard
for substantive due process claims when a "nonseized" person seeks damages
for the use of force by governmental officials. 184 Both before and after
Lewis, substantive due process jurisprudence has included numerous standards and descriptions, including a "professional judgment" standard, 185 an
"undue burden" standard,l 86 an explicit balancing standard, 187 a "shocks the
conscience" standard, 188 and "an implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300-01.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320 (quoting Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105).
181 Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6; Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
182 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994).
183 See id. at 836-38.
184 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840-47 (1998).
185 See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982) (stating that "liability may be imposed only when the decision by the person is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment").
186 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J.
and Souter, J., joint opinion) (stating that an "undue burden" standard protects a woman's substantive Fourteenth Amendment right to an abortion).
187 See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming that if a
person has a liberty interest in refusing artificial hydration and nutrition, determining whether
the person's Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated depends upon "balancing his
liberty interests against the relevant state interests" (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321)).
188 See Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992) (concluding that "the city's
alleged failure to train its employees, or to warn them about known risks of harm, was [not] an
omission that can be properly characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense"); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (stating that "[s]o-called 'substantive due process' prevents the government from engaging in conduct that 'shocks the
179

180
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inquiry for determining whether a person had a fundamental right.l 89 Even
though the Lewis decision attempted to show how its "conscience-shocking"
standard underlies many of its prior substantive due process standards, 190 one
may question how broadly to read the decision, wondering whether the
Court will later narrowly read Lewis by limiting it to its facts.
The Court applied the Graham rule to the facts of Lewis: 191 either the
Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendment-but not both-applies to a police
officer's accidental hitting of a passenger on a motorcycle during a highspeed pursuit. 192 It determined that only the protections of substantive due
process applied because no Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred. 193 For
the Court, the hitting of the passenger was a mere accident, not an "intentional acquisition of physical control" 194 required for a Fourth Amendment
"seizure."195 It also further explained the Graham rule-failure to find a
Fourth Amendment "seizure" did not automatically preclude relief under
substantive due process, even though the Fourth Amendment clearly applies
to a wide variety of police actions. 196 The Graham rule does not bar using
conscience,' ... or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"') (quoting
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26
(1937)); Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.
189 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997). In Glucksberg, a plurality of
the Court offered this view of its substantive due process precedents:
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition,'' .... Second, we have required in substantive due process cases a "careful description" of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest. . . . [T)he Fourteenth Amendment "forbids the government to infringe ...
'fundamental' liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
Id. (citations omitted). The opinion added that unless a fundamental right is present, a government's practice does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if the means used rationally further
a legitimate government interest. ld.
190 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998).
191 Two officers saw a motorcyclist after responding to a call to break up a fight. !d. at 836.
The Lewis majority initially suggested that a police officer pursued a motorcyclist because the
driver was speeding: the officer "saw a motorcycle approaching at high speed." Id. The officers
had no reason to believe that the driver or passenger were involved in the fight. ld. The majority later quoted the Ninth Circuit's more precise description of the reason the officer chased the
motorcyclist: "'the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer
told them to do so."' Id. at 838 (quoting the Ninth Circuit's opinion). The chase occurred at
8:30p.m. in a residential neighborhood and lasted for seventy-five seconds. Id. at 836-37. The
motorcyclist drove dangerously, causing others to swerve off the road. Id. at 839. Both the
motorcyclist and the pursuing officer traveled at 100 mph. Id. The Court noted that to stop
effectively, the police officer needed 650 feet to stop; he had in fact only 100 feet. !d. When the
driver of the motorcycle lost control, the police cruiser accidentally hit the passenger, who died
at the scene. ld.
192 Id. at 842-43.
193 Id. at 843-44.
194 Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989).
195 See infra text accompanying notes 253-272 for a discussion of what constitutes a Fourth
Amendment "seizure."
196 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843.
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substantive due process as a fallback claim when the Fourth Amendment
does not apply for lack of a "seizure."197
Next, the Court articulated what protections were available under substantive due process in this context. In defining what the phrase "substantive
due process" means, the Court had a lot of historical baggage to consider, to
say the least. For years, some Justices and scholars have wondered how the
due process clause has any "substance" in it because the phrase "sounds"
procedural. 198 In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Court began its description of substantive due process on neutral ground: due process protects
against "arbitrary action," 199 a phrase that one may interpret to sound both in
procedure and substance. From this noncontroversial view of due process,
the Lewis Court followed with an astonishing statement: "criteria to identify
what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a governmental officer that is at issue." 200 The Court categorized
substantive due process claims as falling within one of two classes: one challenging legislative acts and the other challenging "executive" acts.201 The
Lewis Court described these categories in a long footnote 202 and mentioned
some cases from its wide-ranging substantive due process jurisprudence.
At issue in Lewis were the executive acts of an individual police officer,
not legislative acts. For the Court, challenges to executive actions include
!d. (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)).
See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980) (stating that '"substantive
due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness'").
199 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845 (citing Wolfv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,555 (1974) and Hurtado
v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)).
200 !d. at 846 (citing no case for this proposition).
201 !d. The Court did not explain what it meant by executive acts.
202 !d. at 847 n.8. In describing these categories, the Lewis Court referred to Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997), a case in which a sharply divided court determined that a
state statute barring a person from causing or aiding the suicide of another was not facially
unconstitutional under substantive due process:
Glucksberg presented a disagreement about the significance of historical examples
of protected liberty in determining whether a given statute could be judged to contravene the Fourteenth Amendment. The differences of opinion turned on the issues of how much history indicating the recognition of the asserted right, viewed at
what level of specificity, is necessary to support the finding of a substantive due
process right entitled to prevail over state legislation.
. . .[A] case challenging executive action on substantive due process
grounds ... presents an issue antecedent to any question about the need for historical examples of enforcing a liberty interest of the sort claimed . . . . [I]n a due
process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be
said to shock the contemporary conscience. That judgment may be informed by a
history of liberty protection, but it necessarily reflects an understanding of traditional executive behavior, of contemporary practice, and of the standards of blame
generally applied to them. Only if the necessary condition of egregious behavior
were satisfied would there be a possibility of recognizing a substantive due process
right to be free of such executive action, and only then might there be a debate
about the sufficiency of historical examples of enforcement of the right claimed, or
its recognition in other ways.
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 n.8 (emphasis added).
197
198
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two broad issues: whether the conduct shocks the conscience;203 and, if so,
whether history or "other" grounds justify recognizing a violation of substantive due process.204 In contrast, challenges to legislative actions focus only on
the second inquiry into history, with probable disagreement as to how to
characterize the right and how deeply rooted the right needs to be.205
The Lewis Court extracted the nebulous "conscience-shocking" standard
from Rochin v. California. 206 Rochin questioned the constitutionality of police officers forcing a suspect to use an emetic to vomit the drugs he had
swallowed.207 Because the Court decided Rochin in 1952, before Mapp v.
Ohio applied the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to the states,2°8
Rochin considered whether substantive due process barred the government
from using the capsules found in the vomit to convict.209 In declaring due
process violated and suppressing the evidence, the Rochin Court stated,
"[t]his is conduct that shocks the conscience,"210 offends "even hardened sensibilities,"211 and is "too close to the rack and the screw" to allow.212
Why the Lewis Court chose "shocks the conscience" as the standard to
meet for challenges to executive actions one can only surmise, although the
Co1,1rt's selection of this standard is consistent with its general trend of limiting the scope of the "substance" protected by the due process clause. The
Court had granted certiorari to resolve a conflict by the courts as to the standard to apply in the context of high-speed vehicular police pursuits: "'shocks
the conscience,' . . . 'deliberate indifference' or 'reckless disregard.'" 213 In
his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that assuming that substantive due process applies, "'shocks the conscience' is the right choice
among the altematives."214
With conscience-shocking as the standard, the Lewis Court attempted to
fit its prior decisions under this rubric, a task that it failed by interpreting
shocking conduct to include both malicious actions and deliberate indifferent
actions in some circumstances.215 The Court reframed tort law by declaring
that deliberately indifferent conduct at times can be "constitutionally shocking."216 It stated: "It should not be surprising that the constitutional concept
of conscience shocking duplicates no traditional category of common-law
fault, but rather points clearly away from liability, or clearly toward it, only at
203 Id. at 846.
204 ld. at 847.
205 I d.; see also id.

at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "history and tradition are
the starting point, but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry").
206 342 u.s. 165, 172 (1952).
207 See id. at 166.
208 367 u.s. 643 (1961).
209 Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168-72.
210 Id. at 172.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 856 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
214 ld.
215 Id. at 848-53.
216 Id. at 852.
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the ends of the tort law's spectrum of culpability."217 The Court's equation,
that shocking conduct equals either malice or deliberate indifferent actions,
attempts to harmonize its conscience-shocking standard with prior substantive due process decisions. But it also represents a drastic limitation on substantive due process claims challenging the use of force.
In its harmonizing, the Court ironically looked to Eighth Amendment
cases to explain the results of its substantive due process decisions,218 an approach at odds with its insistence that the language of a particular amendment determines its standard and with its neat, amendment-specific Graham
rule. 219 The harmonizing interpretative principle it employed was a single
factor-whether officials had the luxury to reflect before acting. 220 If they
did, then the deliberate indifferent conduct committed was conscience-shocking; if they did not have time to think, then only malicious conduct qualified
as conscience-shocking conduct.221
Pulling together its deliberate indifference cases, the Court noted that
governmental officials have a duty to provide for the well-being of an individual in state "custody."222 For example, deliberate indifference is shocking
when officials fail to meet the serious medical needs of detainees223 and when
officials fail to provide for an involuntarily committed person's basic n~eds,
such as "'food, clothing, shelter, ... and safety.'"224 The Court, however, had
to bury in a footnote 225 a similar case that had explicitly rejected a deliberate
indifference standard-Youngberg v. Romeo.226 Youngberg examined the
!d. at 848.
!d. at 849-50.
219 See infra Part II.D.
22o Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851. The Lewis Court stated:
As the very term "deliberate indifference" implies, the standard is sensibly employed only when actual deliberation is practical, and in the custodial situation of a
prison, forethought about an inmate's welfare is not only feasible but obligatory
under a regime that incapacitates a prisoner to exercise ordinary responsibility for
his own welfare.
!d. (citations omitted).
221 !d.
222 !d.
223 See id. at 849-50. The Lewis Court discussed its prior decision in City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983), which had determined that substantive due
process protects pretrial detainees' medical needs at least as broadly as the Eighth Amendment
covers prisoners medical needs. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849-50. Prison officials violate the Eighth
Amendment when they act with "deliberate indifference to [a prisoner's] serious medical
needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Lewis Court characterized City of
Revere as fitting within its shocks-the-conscience standard: such deliberate indifference "is egregious enough to state a substantive due process violation." Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849-50.
224 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 851 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189, 199-200 (1989)).
225 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 n.12.
226 457 U.S. 307, 312 n.ll & 325 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court stated, "we conclude that
the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was
that of the Eighth Amendment." !d. at 325. The error in the instruction was the use of "deliberate indifference" as the standard, which compelled the Court to vacate and remand for a decision under the "professional judgment" standard. !d. It explained:
The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners' rights to punishment
217
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personal security interests of an involuntarily committed mental patient; the
Youngberg Court had adopted a balancing test strongly skewed in favor of
mental health professionals:
[T]he decision, if made by a professional,227 is presumptively valid;
liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional
is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.228
When the Lewis Court cited Youngberg, it quoted the professional judgment
standard, and implicitly placed Youngberg in its "deliberate indifference" category, as applied to persons involuntarily in state custody.229 Presumably,
after Lewis, departures from "professional judgment" would now be "conscience-shocking."
In contrast, other types of substantive due process claims, for the Lewis
Court, require proof of malice.230 Malice emerged as a requirement for substantive due process claims in which officials did not have time to reflect
before acting. This single factor bridged the Court's interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment with the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Lewis Court seemed to ignore how much liberty
prisoners lose upon conviction, by allowing only the same protection to passenger on a pursued motorcycle. For the Lewis Court, a high-speed vehicular
chase is analytically similar to a prison riot, at least under the Constitution:
only a purpose to cause harm exposes officials to constitutional tort
liability.231
In describing the substantive due process standard for personal security
claims for "nonseized" individuals, the Lewis Court has shed its mask and
revealed its explicit preference for contextual balancing. The Court previously declared that the text and the history of an amendment clearly indicated a particular personal security standard.232 In contrast, the Lewis
decision declared what really matters-the context of the alleged violation,
not the language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth Amendment. Although the District Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gamble in charging the jury, it erroneously
used the deliberate-indifference standard articulated in that case.
ld. at 312 n.11.
227 The Court also defmed a "professional" in this context:
[A] person competent, whether by education, training, or experience, to make the
particular decision at issue. Long-term treatment decisions normally should be
made by persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including decisions that
must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject to the supervision of qualified
persons.
Id. at 323 n.30.
228 Id. at 323.
229 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852 n.12.
230 Id. at 852-53.
231 ld. at 853.
232 See supra text accompanying note 179.
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The Court's new conscience-shocking standard will have significant doctrinal and litigation effects on people injured by governmental officials. After Lewis, constitutional tort litigation seeking to protect an individual's right
to personal security will be a strategic game: lawyers will try to pigeon-hole
various actions as Fourth Amendment seizures (because of the Graham rule)
and seek a jury instruction on "reasonableness." If they lose the Fourth
Amendment claim, the fallback Fourteenth Amendment provides protection
only in the most outrageous cases because the Court's "conscience-shocking"
standard is the only other protection available.

III.

The Rule of Graham: Applying the Fourth Amendment to
Public School Teachers' Use of Physical Force

Under the Graham rule, when public school officials use physical force
to control or discipline students, only one amendment applies. 233 Historically, students have sought to protect their interest in bodily integrity under
the Fourteenth Amendment when school officials use physical force to punish them;234 in contrast, when these same officials search them, students
have invoked the Fourth Amendment as the source of constitutional
For a discussion of the Graham rule, see supra Part Il.D.
Many federal courts have examined school officials' use of force to punish for students'
misconduct. See, e.g., Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1997). In Saylor, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ("Sixth Circuit") assumed that striking a student five
times on his buttocks with a paddle for fighting during a class violated both the student's and
parents' constitutional rights, but it held that the school officials had qualified immunity because
the law was not clearly established at the time of the hitting. Id. at 508-10, 516. The teacher had
allegedly asked the principal if he wanted to "watch [him] bust [the student's] butt, and school
officials latter admitted that the force was 'excessive.'" Id. at 511.
The Ninth Circuit in P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996) held that a school
principal did not have qualified immunity for his alleged striking of three students. The principal
allegedly hit one student after hearing someone say "Heil Hitler.'' ld. at 1300. Without allowing
the student to explain, he hit him '"with the back hand and then the front hand' across the
mouth." ld. He then grabbed the student's neck and squeezed it. ld. The student had bruises
for a few days, and he went to the emergency. room for treatment. The principal also allegedly
struck a second student in the chest when the student failed to be quiet at a basketball game
during a special service for a deceased drill teacher. Id. A third student alleged that the principal threw him "headfirst into the lockers" after he put back on his head the cap the principal
asked him to remove. ld.
The Fifth Circuit in Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1990) granted a principal's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a violation of substantive due process. The principal had
allegedly hit an emotionally disturbed student's buttocks three times. Id. at 806. The student
had been disruptive during a class. Id. The student alleged that the hitting caused both physical
and emotional injury, which resulted in six months in a psychiatric ward. Id. at 807. The Fifth
Circuit reiterated its lack of interest in reviewing students' constitutional claims that school officials used excessive force:
We think it a misuse of our judicial power to determine, for example, whether a
teacher has acted arbitrarily in paddling a particular child for certain behavior or
whether in a particular instance of misconduct five licks would have been a more
appropriate punishment than ten licks. We note again the possibility of a civil or
criminal action in state court against a teacher who has excessively punished a
child.
Id. at 809; see also Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269,271-73 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that no
substantive due process violation had occurred when a school official struck a five-year-old and a
233
234
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protection.235
six-year-old student five times for "snickering in the hall" and in class, despite social service
workers' conclusion that the hitting "clearly constituted child abuse"); Woodard v. Los Fresnos
Indep. Sch. Dist., 732 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that no substantive due process
violation for school official's paddling a sixteen-year-old student three times for using abusive
language to a school bus driver).
The Tenth Circuit in Garcia ex rei. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 658 (lOth Cir. 1987) held
that the students' summary judgment materials were sufficient to preclude granting qualified
immunity to school officials. The nine-year-old student alleged that school officials beat her
twice: the first time, they held her ankles and hit her with large split board on the front of her
legs, causing her to bleed; and the second time, they hit her buttocks, causing them to hurt for
three weeks. /d.
In Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1980), the Fourth Circuit held that a student,
but not her parents, had stated a claim for a violation of substantive due process. The complaint
alleged that despite the parents' notice to school officials that they did not want their daughter
subjected to corporal punishment, a teacher nevertheless maliciously and repeatedly hit her,
pushed her into a stationery desk, and twisted her arm. /d. at 614. The student received multiple
injuries and had to stay in the hospital for ten days. /d. She received treatment for "traumatic
injury to the soft tissue of the left hip and thigh, trauma to the skin and soft issue of the left
thigh, and trauma to the soft tissue with ecchyniosis of the left buttock." /d. She also alleged
that she might always experience severe lower back pain. /d.
In Turley v. Sch. Dist., 713 F. Supp. 331, 337 (W.D. Mo. 1989), a federal district court denied
a teacher's motion for summary judgment for the substantive due process violation raised by
students. The teacher had allegedly entered the classroom and saw students fighting, and she
picked up a "plastic baseball bat and, \vithout warning, hit the students on the face, neck, shoulders, and legs." /d. at 332.
See generally Waechter v. Sch. Dist. No. 14-030, 773 F. Supp. 1005, 1010, 1012 (W.D. Mich.
1991) (holding that a deceased student stated a violation of substantive due process when a
teacher punished him by forcing him to do a "gut run" that led to his death). In Waechter, a
handicapped, fifth-grade student \vith known heart problems was allegedly "talking in line with
another classmate during recess." /d. at 1007. As punishment, the recess supervisor compelled
him to run a 350-yard sprint in less than two minutes. /d. The student died while running. /d.
235 The case law suggests that courts recognize significantly greater Fourth Amendment
protections for bodily privacy and security than they do for a student's privacy in objects at
school. See, e.g., Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828-29 (11th
Cir. 1997) (Kravitch, J., dissenting) (contending that New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)
clearly established that school officials could not strip search two eight-year-old students to find
a missing seven dollars; the majority did not determine whether a constitutional violation had
occurred because it held that the school officials had qualified immunity for their searches);
Konop v. Northwestern Sch. Dist., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1208 (D.S.D. 1998) (denying school
officials' summary judgment motion for students' claim that the strip searches they conducted to
find stolen money violated the Fourth Amendment). In Konop, the district court stated: "The
case law is pervasive that a strip search, the objective of which is to recover money, is illegal
absent some reasonable indication that a particular student stole the money." Konop, 26 F.
Supp. 2d. at 1207. The court added that, even if a limited search would have been appropriate, a
strip search was unreasonable because the student had told the school officials that if she had
$200 stashed in her bras or panties, it would have been noticeable without a strip search. /d.; see
also Oliver ex reL Hines v. McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (denying school
officials' qualified immunity defense for strip searches of students to recover stolen money). In
Oliver, two students had told their gym teacher that $4.50 was missing from the locker room.
Oliver, 919 F. Supp. at 1211. To find the missing money, school officials searched the students'
lockers and book bags. /d. After not finding the money, the teachers told the students to remove their bras in order to see if any money would fall out. /d.
Even though the courts apply the Fourth Amendment to searches of students' belongings,
they have often applied a deferential reasonableness standard. See, e.g., DesRoches v. Caprio,
156 F.3d 571, 577-78 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a search of student's backpack for missing
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Under the Court's current jurisprudence, with its disdain of substantive
due process claims, the constitutionality of school officials' use of force upon
students depends upon which amendment of the Constitution doctrinally applies (the Graham rule) and logically on the circumstances precipitating the
teachers' physical responses. 236 Recent Supreme Court decisions support aptennis shoes was reasonable because the teacher developed reasonable suspicion by a process of
elimination after all other students had granted permission to search). The Fourth Circuit failed
to protect the student's Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his backpack by discounting the
coercive effect of the school's policy of suspending students for ten days if they refused to consent to searches, id. at 573, and allowed the students' (coerced) "permission" to establish reasonable suspicion as to the student who refused to allow the search. The Fourth Circuit feebly
explained:
[W]hile we agree, of course, that actual suspension for refusal to consent constitutes
such an infringement when the proposed search is unreasonable, we cannot agree
that the Fourth Amendment is implicated merely by a demand to search coupled
with threats of punishment, where the threats are unsuccessful in bringing about
the individual's consent.
!d. at 577. The court admitted that the school officials lacked reasonable suspicion as to the
individual student bringing suit until all the other students had "consented" to the search. !d. at
577-78.
Similarly, in Cornfield ex rei. Lewis v. School Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir.
1993), the Seventh Circuit held that a strip search of a student was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, and in dicta it stated that officials would have qualified immunity even if they had
violated the Fourth Amendment. In Cornfield, the Seventh Circuit held that school officials had
reasonable suspicion to believe that a sixteen-year-old student enrolled in a behavior disorder
program was '"crotching drugs"' because he "appeared 'too well-endowed"' and began yelling
when asked about whether he was smuggling drugs. !d. at 1319. School officials then required
him to change from his "street clothes and put on a gym uniform" as they watched. /d. Although accepting this search as reasonable, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless recognized that
some strip searches would be unreasonable: "a highly intrusive search in response to a minor
infraction" and "a nude search of a student by an administrator or teacher of the opposite sex."
!d. at 1320.
The Ninth Circuit in Smith v. McGlothlin, 119 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1997) affirmed the
dismissal of a student's Fourth Amendment search claim because officials had qualified immunity. In Smith, the Ninth Circuit discussed only in dicta the constitutionality of a vice principal's
search of a group of students; the vice principal had seen the students with a "cloud of smoke
over their heads" and watched them make furtive gestures, suggesting the discarding of "smoking materials." /d. at 787. The court suggested that reasonable suspicion was not necessary for
the search. /d. at 788; see also Thompson v. Carthage Sch. Dist.. 87 F.3d 979, 980-84 (8th Cir.
1996) (holding that a search of "all male students in grades six to twelve" was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment after a school bus driver reported to the principal that there were "fresh
cuts" in the bus seats). The principal ordered students to remove their shoes and socks and to
empty their pockets. Thompson, 87 F. 3d at 980. The court upheld the search as necessary to
further "student safety and school discipline." /d. at 983; Brousseau v. Town of Westerly, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 177, 180 (D.R.I. 1998) (granting school officials' motion for summary judgment on
student's Fourth Amendment claim). In Brousseau, the district court held that officials' frisking
of students in the cafeteria to find a missing knife used to cut pizza was reasonable. Brousseau,
11 F. Supp. 2d at 182. It stated: "The interest of school officials in searching for drugs or weapons, ordinarily is deemed more compelling and of greater urgency than searches for other kinds
of contraband." /d.
236 Some cases have involved school officials using physical force to control students. See,
e.g., London v. Dirs. of the Dewitt Pub. Schs., 194 F.3d 873, 875-76 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that
no violation of substantive due process occurred when a coach forcefully removed student from
cafeteria who had engaged in "horseplay" or "scuffling." In response, the student slammed the
coach into a table, with the coach later dragging the student on the floor for fifteen feet, causing
the student to hit his head on a pole); Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist., 68 F.3d 1010, 1014-1016 (7th
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plying the protection of the Fourth Amendment, not the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, to the use of force by school
officials, as well as to searches by school officials.237
Students' interest in personal security, whether it is implicated by school
officials' using physical force to control or punish them, lies doctrinally near
the chasm between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.238 Nevertheless, a student's interest in bodily integrity, under the Court's modem jurisprudence, should fall within the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Although students hit with wooden paddles in the 1970s did not question
the constitutionality of this practice under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court, in its 1985 decision New Jersey v. T.L.O., applied the Fourth
Amendment in the public schools, as it evaluated the constitutionality of a
principal's search of a student's purse for cigarettes.239 Ten years later in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court also applied the Fourth
Amendment to the question of whether school officials acted constitutionally
in requiring athletes to submit to mandatory drug testing as a condition of
participation in school sports.240 In applying the Fourth Amendment to these
cases, the Court considered three issues: (1) whether school officials were
governmental actors subject to the Fourth Amendment;241 (2) whether their
actions constituted a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment;242 and (3) if so, whether the conduct was reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.243 The Court's analysis of these issues
supports applying the Fourth Amendment to the use of force by school
officials.

A. School Officials as Governmental Actors
The seminal case that directly answered the question of whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to school teachers was New Jersey v. T.L.O.
T.L. 0. questioned whether public school teachers simply act as substitute
parents during the school day and thus are private persons not governed by
the Fourth Amendment.244 The T.L.O. Court explicitly rejected such a charCir. 1995) (holding that no constitutional violation under either the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment occurred for a teacher's grabbing of a student by the arm to escort her out of the
room after the student had told another student, "I'm going to kick your ass right here and
now"); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 1151, 1154 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a student had
alleged a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by claiming that a principal threw her to the
floor and against a wall and slapped her for violating field trip restrictions); Jones v. Witinski,
931 F. Supp. 364, 371 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that there was no substantive due process violation when teacher grabbed student, unintentionally causing student to hit his desk and the
blackboard).
237 See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
238 The Eighth Amendment cannot apply in this context because the Court has limited the
Eighth Amendment to safeguard only the personal security interests of prisoners, not students.
See supra Part II.B.l.
239 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328-33 (1985).
240 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995).
241 See infra Part III.A.
242 See infra Part III.B.
243 See infra Part III.C.
244 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334-37.
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acterization and held that teachers are state actors governed by the Fourth
Amendment. 245 Vernonia also adhered to this view.246
In both T.L.O. and Vernonia, the Court distinguished between parental
authority and teaching authority:247 school officials have both "custodial and
tutelary" powers248 that are not linked to parental authority. In defining
school officials' powers, the Court relied solely on modem notions of public
education because public education was not in the fabric of our society when
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were enacted.249 Instead, private
education was the model, with the private school teacher having the authority over a student only to the degree authorized by the student's parents.250
With the passage of modem compulsory education laws, however, the Court
viewed public school teachers as possessing authority greater. than that of
parents,251 if they act "in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and
disciplinary policies. "252
Both decisions also noted that the Court had previously scrutinized the
actions of teachers as state actors for alleged violations of procedural due
process253 and the First Amendment.254 Yet, in T.L.O., the government argued that "the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out by law
enforcement officers."255 In response, the Court admitted that the Framers
designed the Fourth Amendment to address the "pre-Revolutionary practice
of using general warrants or 'writs of assistance' to authorize searches for
contraband by officers of the Crown." 256 Nevertheless, it more broadly characterized the "coverage" currently provided by the Fourth Amendment:
"The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized by countless decisions
Id. at 336.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-55.
247 Id. at 655 ("In T.L.O., we rejected the notion that public schools ... exercise only
parental power over their students, which of course is not subject to constitutional constraints.");
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 ("Today's public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies.").
248 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
249 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336 (deciding that the historical concept that school teachers are
"private" individuals, acting on behalf of parents, "is in tension with contemporary reality and
the teachings of' the Court).
250 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,661 (1977) (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
CoMMENTARIES *120, *453).
251 See generally Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at
662.
252 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
253 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), which stated that
teachers meet procedural due process requirements when discussing with students misconduct
"minutes after it has occurred"); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336.
254 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273
(1988), which discussed school officials' authority to censor publications; Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986), which allowed school officials to limit "offensively lewd
and indecent speech" at an assembly; Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969), which examined school officials' ability to silence personal expression at school).
255 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 334.
256 Id. at 335.
245
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of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials."257 With the Court's determination that public school teachers were acting as "governmental officials"
and not as substitute parents, the Court then applied the Fourth Amendment
to teachers who commit searches and seizures as defined by the Fourth
Amendment.

B.

Seizing a Person: The Court's Fourth Amendment Definitions

Under both the language of the Fourth Amendment and the Court's
Graham rule, the use of force by public school teachers must constitute a
"seizure" of a student for the Fourth Amendment to apply.258 The Supreme
Court has articulated several definitions of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure" of a person.259
Discerning whether a "seizure" has occurred is no easy task. Not only
has the Court given several definitions, but it has also employed conflicting
approaches to justify its conclusion that a seizure occurred.260 Although the
current Court considers the common law usually to be determinative of
whether a seizure or a search was "reasonable" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment,Z61 it has explicitly rejected using the common law as the
only means to determine what constitutes a "seizure."262
The Court's "seizure" definitions generally fall within two broad categories: (1) governmental officials intentionally using physical force to stop an
individual;263 and (2) officials asserting authority to compel a stop and an
Id.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards against "unreasonable searches and seizures," and
the Graham rule limits personal security force clainls to scrutiny under the Fourth, Eighth, or
Fourteenth Amendments. For a discussion of the Graham rule, see infra Part II.D.
259 See infra text accompanying notes 262-265.
260 See infra text accompanying notes 263-263.
261 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
262 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 n.2 (1991). In Hodari D., the Court
declared that it was both expanding and narrowing the protections provided by the common law.
It stated, "We have consulted the common law to explain the meaning of seizure-and contrary
to the dissent's portrayal, to e:1:pand rather than contract that meaning." Id. In the same footnote, however, the Hodari D. Court noted that it would not apply the common law's protection
against unlawful attempted seizures to evaluate whether an officer's attempt to seize a suspect
was constitutional. ld.
263 Under this category, the narrow seizure definition is whether there was "a governmental temtination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower v.
County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989). In Hodari D, the Court more broadly defined the use
of physical force as a seizure: "To constitute an arrest-the quintessential 'seizure of the person'
under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence-the mere grasping or application of physical force
with lawful authority, whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was sufficient."
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843-44 (1998)
{holding that no seizure occurred because officer did not intentionally crash into person, killing
hinl); Brower, 489 U.S. at 597 {holding that seizure occurred because officer intentionally established a roadblock designed to stop person, killing hinl); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7
{1985) (determining that a police shooting of a fleeing felon was a seizure). See generally Hodari
D., 499 U.S. at 626 {"The word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful.");
257
258
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individual's compliance with that authority. 264 Both categories include within
them the notion of governmental actions limiting a person's liberty, because
otherwise the meetings between officials and individuals would be consensual
encounters.265 As the Court recently reiterated, "when an officer, without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has the right to ignore the police and go about his business."266
The Graham Court explicitly left open whether the Fourth Amendment
continues "beyond the point at which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins,"267 a time when a person is not "free."268
The first "seizure" category-physical force-evolved from the many
cases about police officers.269 Through the years, the Court has significantly
narrowed this definition. Initially, the Court stated that the use of physical
force constituted a "seizure."270 It also stated that even if a person fled after
being grabbed, a "seizure" has occurred: "The word 'seizure' readily bears
the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful." 271 Nevertheless,
for the Court to determine that a Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred, the
force used would have to amount to an "intentional acquisition of physical
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 n.16 (1968) (stating that a seizure occurs when "the officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen").
264 In Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, the Supreme Court added compliance with an official's
show of authority as a necessary element of this type of seizure. In doing so, it had to interpret
its prior seizure cases as only stating one of two requirements for a Fourth Amendment seizure.
See id. Before Hodari D., the Court had focused on whether '"in view of all the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave."' /d. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
265 See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1989) (framing the seizure question as
"whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter").
266 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498
(1983)). In addition to these broad definitions, the Graham decision added a significant gloss to
the Court's Fourth Amendment "seizure" definitions: the person subject to the actions above
must be a "free citizen." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). In Graham, the Court
held that "claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment ... , rather than under the 'substantive due process' approach."
/d. at 395; see also id. at 394 (stating that the force was applied to a "free citizen"); County of
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844-45 (1998) (quoting with approval Pleasant v. Zamieski,
895 F.2d 272, 276 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990), which stated that Graham "preserve[s] fourteenth amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or
her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"). Nevertheless, one does not know whether the Graham
Court's reference to a "free citizen" applies only when evaluating the actions of "law enforcement officers," Graham, 490 U.S. at 395, rather than other officials, such as school teachers. In
dicta, the Vernonia Court stated that school officials do not have a substantive due process duty
to protect one student from another, even though school officials have "custodial" power.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
267 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 n.10.

268 /d.
269 See supra note 262.
270 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 n.16 (1968).
271 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
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control."272 As a result of this definition, accidental use of physical force is
not a Fourth Amendment "seizure" because it is not an "intentional" act.273
The second seizure category-assertion of authority-has also narrowed through the years. Initially, the Court held that when law enforcement officers engage in a "show of authority," 274 a "seizure" has occurred.
Later, the Court added a new requirement: the individual subject to this
"show of authority" must comply with it.21s
These two "seizure" categories are admittedly overly-simplified summaries of the Court's complex "seizure" definitions. Applying these definitions
is further complicated by the Court's Graham rule. For example, prison officials often "intentionally" apply physical force to control prisoners, but under
the Graham rule, these actions are governed only by the Eighth Amendment.276 A brief look at the circumstances in which the Court has applied the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments shows the difficulty of discerning when
the Fourth Amendment applies.
1.

The Fourth Amendment: Searches and Seizures by Law Enforcement
and School Officials

The Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to personal security
claims before,277 during,278 and after arrests.279 In addition, the Court has
examined searches by public school officials under the Fourth Amendment.280 (One of the school cases also involved a Fourth Amendment
"seizure" of property which, as in many cases, followed immediately after a
Fourth Amendment "search.")281
Many decisions address the use of force by law enforcement officials.
Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor examined the use of physical
force during criminal investigations. Terry v. Ohio also noted a person's interest in personal security when officers seek to conduct an investigatory stop
and frisk. 282 And, after arrest, the Court has also applied the Fourth Amendment to bodily integrity claims. In Schmerber, a police officer arrested a
driver in an automobile accident while in the hospital.283 At the officer's
request and over the objection of the injured driver, a physician withdrew
blood.284 Even though this search was found to be reasonable,285 the Court
272
273
274
275
276
277
278

Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 (1998).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 n.16 (stating that a "show of authority" may constitute a seizure).
See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628-29.
See supra text accompanying note 298.
See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-99 (1989).
See, e.g., Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1989); Tennessee v. Gamer,
471 u.s. 1, 7 (1985).
279 See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 771 (1966).
280 See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333-37 (1985).
281 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328-29.
282 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-20 (1968).
283 Sclzmerber, 384 U.S. at 758.
284 Id. at 758-59.
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stated that "[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State."286
In Winston v. Lee, the state's requested intrusion-compelled surgery to remove a bullet from an arrested suspect-was unwarranted under the Fourth
Amendment287 .
In a related area, the Court also has applied the Fourth Amendment to
wrongful seizure claims after arrest, even when bodily integrity interests were
not involved. In both Gerstein v. Pugh288 and County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,Z89 the Court considered what process the Fourth Amendment required in order to protect a suspect's Fourth Amendment interest.
In addition to these law enforcement decisions, the Court has also applied the Fourth Amendment to the actions of public school teachers and
administrators who conducted searches to discern whether students had violated school rules. 290 The purpose of the initial search was to further the
school's interest in maintaining discipline and an effective educational environment. For example, in 1985, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., an assistant vice
principal opened the purse of a fourteen-year-old student based on reasonable suspicion that she had violated a school rule by smoking in the bathroom.291 This search later led to the seizure of drugs and drug
paraphemalia.292 A decade later, in 1995, the Court decided Vernonia School
District 471 v. Acton, six years after the Court's decision in Graham v. Connor. The Court used the Fourth Amendment to examine the constitutionality
of the school's mandatory, random urinalysis drug tests for students participating in athletic programs. 293 Both school cases focused on the Fourth
Amendment.
Although the Court has applied the Fourth Amendment to the actions of
law enforcement and school officials that implicate bodily integrity interests,
it has also applied the Fourteenth, not the Fourth, Amendment to personal
security claims involving law enforcement officials and of a state-court judge
convicted of sexually assaulting women. 294 A brief consideration of these

286

/d. at 772.
/d. at 767.

287

470

285

u.s. 759, 767 (1985).

288 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975) (holding that States "must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.").
289 500 U.S. 44, 47 (1991). In County of Riverside, the Court attempted to impose a brightline test as to how prompt a probable cause hearing must be when an officer arrests a person
without a warrant. /d. at 56·57. The Court stated that a probable cause hearing that occurs
within forty-eight hours for a person arrested without a warrant is presumptively reasonable.
See id. at 56. When that does not happen, the government has the burden of justifying the delay.
/d. at 57. In addition, even a hearing that occurs within the forty-eight hour period may violate
the Fourth Amendment if the delay was unreasonable. /d. at 56.
290 See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 652-53; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 329. For a discussion of
these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 229-50.
291 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328.

292 /d.
293 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
294 See infra text accompanying notes 321-25.

2000]

Physical Force as a Fourth Amendement Seizure

47

Fourteenth Amendment cases highlights the difficulty of forcing a plaintiff to
choose between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
2.

The Fourteenth Amendment: The Accidental Use of Force, Force
During "Custody," and Intentional Force Without Custody

Under the Graham rule, the Fourteenth Amendment serves as a fallback
amendment for personal security litigation: it applies only if neither the
Fourth nor the Eighth Amendment implicates an individual's interest in personal security.295 Determining when the Fourteenth Amendment applies
does not depend upon who used physical force, because the actions of police
officers and school officials may implicate either the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendment.296 The Court's hodgepodge personal security jurisprudence instructs that the Fourteenth Amendment applies in several circumstances
where the Fourth does not: (1) when officials accidentally use force to stop a
person;297 (2) when officials use force on or fail to protect individuals in some
custodial situations;298 and (3) when officials intentionally use shocking force
See supra text accompanying notes 152-155.
In T.L.O., the Court held that even though the Fourth Amendment historically centered
on police practices, it also .applied to school officials. See also supra text accompanying notes
254-257. Similarly, the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment also
applies to police officers, whose actions trigger scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment only if
their conduct is a "search" or "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 334-37; see supra text accompanying notes 139-143, 191-202.
297 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 569 U.S. 833, 842-45 (1998); Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595-99 (1989). For a discussion of these cases, see supra Part II.E.2.
298 See, e.g., DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989)
(holding that there is no duty for a state to protect child who was not in custody at the time of
beating); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (holding that prison officials have no
greater duty under the Fourteenth Amendment than they do under the Eighth Amendment to
protect a prisoner's interest in personal security during a prison riot); Davidson v. Cannon, 474
U.S. 344 (1986) (finding no duty to protect prisoner from harm caused by another prisoner because the official allegedly acted only negligently); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)
(holding that the state has no duty to protect pretrial detainee from slipping on a pillow on stairs
because such negligence does not constitute a Fourteenth Amendment "deprivation");
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (holding that a state has a duty to involuntarily
committed mental patient "to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint"). The Court's Graham rule would require that the
Fourteenth Amendment claims raised by prisoners in both Davidson and Whitley today would
fall under only the Eighth Amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 145-146. Since the
Court had interpreted the Eighth Amendment to have a malice standard for prison riots and
discipline and the Fourteenth Amendment as requiring shocking conduct, the Whitley Court
discerned the Fourteenth Amendment as providing no "extra" protection for the right to personal security:
We think the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves as the primary source
of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases such as this one, where the
deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified. It would indeed
be surprising if, in the context of forceful prison security measures, "conduct that
shocks the conscience" or "afford[s] brutality the cloak of law," and so violates the
Fourteenth Amendment were not also punishment "inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency" and "repugnant to the conscience of mankind" in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the Eighth Amendment personal
295
296
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in some noncustodial circumstances.299
The first category is easy to describe-the accidental use of force. Two
decisions-Brower v. County of Inyo 300 and County of Sacramento v.
Lewis301 -when read together create a doctrinal line between the Fourth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment as to accidental uses of force.
The Brower Court stated that no Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when
police officers accidentally use physical force and cause injury.302 In that situation, according to Lewis, the Fourteenth Amendment nevertheless does apply.303 The Lewis Court relied on precedent for its distinction between the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment.304 Under its narrowing precedents, an
accident, for the Court, was just not a "seizure."305
The second category-the use of force during custody-is complex.
When "custody" is present, officials sometimes have a duty to protect the
confined person from harm, but when a person is not in custody, no duty
arises. 306 The famous case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County307 set forth this
custodial requirement for the Fourteenth Amendment: "it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf-through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of
personal liberty-which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause."308 Defining what it meant by "custody,"
the Court noted that "suspects in police custody"309 are like prisoners: the
state has a Fourteenth Amendment duty to provide medical care to the suspects,310 and the Eighth Amendment creates this same duty with respect to
prisoners.311 This custodial duty safeguards a confined person from harming
security standard, see supra text accompanying notes 144-144; see generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (stating that a pretrial detainee has a Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process protection from "conditions [that] amount to punishment of the detainee").
299 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 201-63 (1997) (discussing the criminal
conviction of a state-court judge who had been found guilty of violating the substantive due
process rights of women he had sexually assaulted); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S.
115, 128 (1992) (holding that a governmental employer's failure to provide a safe working environment was not "arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense"). For a discussion
of this category of due process violation, see infra text accompanying notes 325-329.
300 489 u.s. 593 (1989).
301 569 u.s. 833 (1998).
302 Brower, 489 U.S. at 598-99.
303 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842-45; for a discussion of this case, see supra Part II.D.2.
304 /d. at 843-44 (relying on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) and Brower,
489 U.S. at 596-97. For a discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 262-264.
305 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 843-44.
306 See infra notes 308-308.
307 489 u.s. 189 (1989).
308 !d. at 200.
309 !d. at 199.
310 !d. (citing City of Revere v. Massachusetts, 463 U.S. 239,244 (1983)); see also Lewis, 523
U.S. at 850 (stating that "deliberately indifferent conduct must also be enough to satisfy the fault
requirement for due process claims based on the medical needs of someone jailed while awaiting
trial").
311 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
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herself,312 from other confined persons harming her,313 and from state officials harming the confined persons.3 14
What the DeShaney Court meant by "other similar restraint," however,
is unclear. In Vernonia, the Court examined the degree of control officials
have over students as it evaluated, under the Fourth Amendment, the constitutionality of drug testing some students. In dicta, the Vernonia Court mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that school officials did not have
a Fourteenth Amendment "'duty to protect' "315 students from harming each
other. Even though school officials have "custodial and tutelary" powers,316
they do not have the necessary "degree of control over children as to give
rise to a constitutional" duty.317 School officials thus have "custodial" powers, but students are not in "custody."318 Perhaps students are "free citizens"
as described in Graham319 and subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny when a
"search" or "seizure" occurs.
Similarly, when officials arrest a person, officials clearly have "custody"
of the person. Under Supreme Court precedents, such "custody" is a seizure,
subject to scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.320 But the Graham Court
also noted in dicta that at some point the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
the confined suspect: the Fourteenth Amendment protects the personal security interests of "pretrial detainees" in being free "from excessive force
that amounts to punishment."321 It did note,· however, that it had not resolved the following question: "whether the Fourth Amendment continues to
provide individuals with protection against deliberate use of excessive force
beyond the point at which arrests ends and pretrial detention begins."322
312 See generally Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (holding that a violent
involuntarily committed person has liberty interests that "require the State to provide minimally
adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint"). The
Court has also upheld the involuntarily commitment of individuals dangerous to the public. See,
e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U:S. 346, 366 (1997) ("While we have upheld state civil commitment statutes that aim both to incapacitate and to treat, . . . we have never held that the Constitution prevents a State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who
nevertheless pose a danger to others").
313 See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320.
314 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (stating that the Due Process
Clause "protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment") (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)).
315 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (quoting DeS haney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
316 ld.
317 ld. In contrast, ten years earlier in New Jersey v. T.L.O., two Justices had characterized
this custodial power as creating an "obligation" for school officials to protect both students and
teachers from misbehaving students. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring) Goined by Justice O'Connor).
318 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655.
319 See supra text accompanying note 312.
320 See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (stating that "all claims that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard.").
321 Id. at 395 n.10.
322 !d.
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Thus, if the purpose of the force was to "punish," then the Fourteenth
Amendment applies, according to the Court, but if the force applied was not
to punish, then it is unresolved whether the Fourth Amendment may still
apply.
The third category-intentional force without custody-provides that
egregious conduct by state officials violates the Constitution, even if the force
used does not seem to fall easily under any other amendment. The Court
used substantive due process to disapprove of state officials' egregious behavior when it decided Rochin v. California323 in 1952, because at that time
the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the states.324
Similarly, the Court in Lanier allowed substantive due process to apply
to the egregious conduct of a state-court judge convicted of sexually assaulting "several women in his judicial chambers."325 The women were not in any
sense in "custody," but were harmed by a person abusing his state position
of power. For these actions, substantive due process was the proper claim.
In upholding the judge's criminal conviction,326 the Court quoted an instruction the jury used in finding that the judge violated substantive due process.327 The instruction questions whether the actions were conscienceshocking. With "conscience-shocking" as the substantive due process standard, one can easily discern why under the rule of Graham Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process is a fallback claim: if one proves "conscience-shocking" conduct, then the same verdict would occur under the
Fourth Amendment or Eighth Amendment, if they applied. If one cannot
meet this incredibly high standard, however, the result might be different
323 342 u.s. 165 (1952).
324 In 1998, the Court noted that "today [Rochin] would be treated under the Fourth
Amendment." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 n.9 (1998). In Rochin, police
officers forcibly entered the suspect's room, questioned him about capsules near his bed, and
jumped him when the suspect swallowed them. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166. After the suspect was
handcuffed, he was taken to a hospital where a doctor, at the request of police officers, "forced
an emetic solution through a tube into [the suspect's] stomach against his will" to recover the
two capsules. ld.
325 United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 261 (1997).
326 At issue was whether a violation of "substantive due process" gave the judge sufficient
notice that his actions made him criminally liable under a federal statute. Id.
327 ld. at 262. The instructions provided as follows:
Included in the liberty protected by the [Due Process Clause of the] Fourteenth
Amendment is the concept of personal bodily integrity and the right to be free of
unauthorized and unlawful physical abuse by state intrusion. Thus, this protected
right of liberty provides that no person shall be subject to physical or bodily abuse
without lawful justification by a state official acting or claiming to act under the
color of the laws of any state of the United States when that official's conduct is so
demeaning and harmful under all the circumstances as to shock one's consci[ence].
Freedom from such physical abuse includes the right to be free from certain sexually motivated physical assaults and coerced sexual battery. It is not, however,
every unjustified touching or grabbing by a state official that constitutes a violation
of a person's constitutional rights. The physical abuse must be of a serious substantial nature that involves physical force, mental coercion, bodily injury or emotional
damage which is shocking to one's consc[ience].
Id. (quoting Appendix, 186-87). This instruction appears consistent with the Court's recent
glosses on sub,stantive due process in Lewis. See infra Part II.E.2.
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under the Fourth or Eighth Amendment than under the Fourteenth. Consequently, the Court's personal security jurisprudence ensures that which
amendment applies matters in modem litigation.
The Court's distinctions between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment are difficult to comprehend. One would have logically thought that the
Fourth Amendment governs the actions of police officers alone. But, in making clear that the type of action is more significant than who performs it, the
Court has laid the groundwork for applying the Fourth Amendment to the
use of force by school officials.
C.

School Officials' Use of Physical Force as a Fourth Amendment
"Seizure"

When students leave their homes and enter the public schools, they become subject to the authority of school officials, who have both "custodial
and tutelary" powers.328 In exercising these powers, school officials apply
physical force to students in two general ways: (1) to stop a student from
harming another student or school official; and (2) to punish a student for
violating a school rule. When officials use physical force in this manner, their
actions implicate the Fourth Amendment because, under the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence, their actions are seizures.
But, the Supreme Court has never addressed whether the Fourth
Amendment applies to force used against students. Yet, 'in Ingraham, it discussed the bodily integrity interests of students in conjunction with its determination that students were not entitled to a hearing prior to a school official
punishing them for their misdeeds in schooJ.329 The Court described the procedural liberty interests of students; it did not grant review to determine
whether corporal punishment violated substantive due process, and it noted
that the students did not raise the Fourth Amendment as a basis for
recovery.330
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977). The Court balanced interests in Ingraham, and one could arguably conclude that its analysis here suggests that students would have
difficulty meeting either the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard or the Fourteenth
Amendment's "shocks-the-conscience" standard. The Court, however, decided Ingraham in
1977, long before its more detailed personal security jurisprudence.
In 1977, bodily integrity claims-those of criminal suspects, detainees, and students-did
not fall within a particular Bill of Rights provision. Instead, the co=on sense Glick factors
were a part of most courts' inquiries as to whether the force violated the Constitution. See
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d. 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). Not until1985 did the Court specify that uses of
deadly force by police officers should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so,
the Court also stated that it would assess reasonableness by looking at evolving police practices-not just the co=on law. Thus, balancing interests today, whether done under the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard or the Fourteenth Amendment's "shocks-the-conscience" standard, differs from the Court's balancing in 1977, which lacked important social science data now available in 2000. See Urbonya, supra note 1. In addition, balancing focuses on a
different issue-whether a standard has been violated; it does not address which amendment
applies.
330 Ingraham, 490 U.S. at 660 n.12, 673 n.42.
328 See, e.g.,
329
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In determining whether force to control students constitutes a "seizure,"
one must study what the Court said in New Jersey v. T.L.0. 331 and its progeny. In these decisions, the Court easily extended the Fourth Amendment to
apply to the actions of school teachers seeking evidence that students had
violated school rules. The Court could have looked at these same actions
under the Fourteenth Amendment and asked whether the school officials'
action implicated the "liberty" interests of students. 332 It did not. Instead, it
viewed school officials' searches as invading the privacy interests of students
safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment, even when what was at issue was a
violation of school rules.
After T.L.O., the Court. created the rule of Graham: if the Fourth
Amendment applies to official actions implicating personal security, then
substantive due process does not apply. In these school cases, the Fourth
Amendment applied because school officials engaged in "searches," an activity to which the Fourth Amendment usually applies. When school officials
use physical force to control students, they "seize" them within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. Consequently, the Court's well-established, but
narrowing, "seizure" doctrines easily apply to uses of force by school
officials.

331

469 U.S. 325 (1985). For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes

244-249.
332 See Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and Due Process of Law,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 617, 634-35 (1997). Professor Wells has been a vigorous advocate of
applying the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Fourth Amendment, to actions that implicate
an individual's interest in personal security:
The blunt truth is that the Court in Gamer and Graham significantly extended the
range of interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, and did so with virtually no
discussion of the step it was taking. There is nothing in the background of the
Fourth Amendment, nor in the Fourth Amendment precedents before Garner, to
support the notion that one of the amendment's aims is to protect the interest in
personal security against physical harm.
!d. at 628-29 (footnotes omitted). Professor Wells has criticized applying the Fourth Amendment to the actions of police officers that infringe on a person's interest in personal security. /d.
at 629-31. Instead, he views the Fourth Amendment as safeguarding a person's interest in privacy. /d. at 628. According to Professor Beerman, Professor Wells' standard for government
actions covered under substantive due process is quite broad-simply asking "whether there was
an abuse of power by the defendant official." Jack M. Beerman, Common Law Elements of the
Section 1983 Action, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 695, 744 (1997). Although the Supreme Court has
stated that arbitrary action is actionable under the substantive due process component of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see supra text accompanying note 199, Professor Beerman soundly perceives the modern Court's preference against using substantive due process as a basis for a constitutional violation makes such a finding unlikely:
The Court has expressed extreme reluctance to recognize new claims under substantive due process. . . . It may be, given the Court's resistance to constitutional
tort litigation, that an actual substantive due process standard would be extremely
difficult to meet and that plaintiffs are better off if they can base their claims on a
particular provision of the Bill of Rights.
/d. at 745. Professor Beerman's view of the difficulty of establishing a substantive due process
violation was borne out in the Supreme Court's decision rendered soon after his article-County
of Sacramento v. Lewis. For a discussion of this case, see supra Part II.E.2.
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Force Used to Control Students

When students physically fight or are on the verge of obvious violence,
school officials reasonably exercise their custodial and tutelary powers by intervening. When these officials grab students, they seize students within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because their actions fall within the
Brower definition of an "intentional acquisition of physical control." Public
school officials perform the same type of act that the Court has clearly labeled a seizure when police officers perform it.333 Both the police officer and
school officials use physical force to control their environment. Whether this
grabbing violates the Fourth Amendment is a separate inquiry, one that requires defining "reasonableness" in the context of the public schools.
If the grabbing is ineffective and students break away, then only the initial grabbing is a "seizure." As the Court explained in Hodari D., "during the
period offugitivity," there is no continuing "seizure."334 In addition, compulsory attendance laws do not make students "seized" throughout the day as
they attend public school because they may nevertheless attend private
schools, where the Fourth Amendment is not implicated because private
school teachers are not "governmental" actors under the Court's state-action
doctrine. In many respects, public school students are therefore like the
"free citizens" referred to in Graham. When public school officials use intentional physical force, they effectuate a "seizure" that is neither a classic arrest
nor an investigatory stop but a type of the "other 'seizure' of a free citizen"
that Graham mentioned.
Even though school officials perform acts of policing similar to those
done by law enforcement officials, one further distinction is necessary before
the use of physical force to control falls under the protection of the Fourth
Amendment: the appropriate use of force in schools differs dramatically from
the kind of sexual assault claims that have generally been considered under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Both actions implicate the kind of "grabbing"
that the Fourth Amendment concerns. But, these acts differ in their purpose:
in one situation the force used is to control the school learning environment;
a school official may simply err in judgment as to the appropriate degree of
force. Yet, in the sexual abuse case, any physical contact is wrong from the
moment of touching. Lower courts have recognized this distinction by applying the Fourteenth, and not the Fourth, Amendment to the actions of police
officers who sexually assault individuals that they have stopped pursuant to
their Fourth Amendment powers.335
See infra text accompanying notes 267-73.
California v. Hodari D., 490 U.S. 621, 625 (1991).
335 See, e.g., Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 1998) (rejecting the
application of the Fourth Amendment to a claim that a police officer raped person stopped for
traffic violation, stating "that no amount of force could have been reasonable to achieve [this
officer's] purpose" and concluding that his actions were "shocking"); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d
620, 628 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Because the [alleged rape] inflicted did not occur in the course of an
attempted arrest or apprehension of one suspected of criminal conduct, ... the claim was not
one of a Fourth Amendment violation, but of the violation of the substantive due process right
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be subjected by anyone acting under color of state law _
to the wanton infliction of physical harm").
333

334
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Although Fourth Amendment inquiries are generally "objective" and refrain from examining the motivations of the actor, the T.L.O. Court nevertheless looked at the purpose of the school officials' actions in deciding
whether the Fourth Amendment applied to searches of students. It stated:
"Today's public school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily
conferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of
publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies."336 Thus, in using
physical force to control students, school officials seek to maintain the educational environment.
School officials thus effect a Fourth Amendment "seizure" when they
use physical force to break up a fight or to stop one from happening. These
actions are intentional and result in control over the student, who would otherwise be at liberty to leave.
2.

Force Used to Punish Students

In contrast, when school officials use physical force to punish students,
the context differs. Nevertheless, how one imagines and characterizes the
protean interactions between school officials and students does not alter the
essential analysis of the Fourth Amendment: when school officials intentionally use physical force to punish students, their actions constitute a Fourth
Amendment seizure because the students would not be "free to leave."
Most officials likely would assert that the purpose behind their hitting
was to instill discipline and maintain an effective learning environment.337
School officials therefore intentionally use physical force to acquire control
over the struck students. In addition, in most circumstances, students submit
to officials' show of authority and receive their physical punishment. The act
of hitting in the context of corporal punishment is thus similar to the use of
physical force to control disruptive students, except that the need for immediate action is significantly less obvious: students ready to hit each other pose
a greater threat to order or than do students who refuse to quit talking during
an exam. Nevertheless, the acts performed by school officials are similar.
When officials use physical force to punish students, their actions implicate the Fourth Amendment, despite the Court's dicta in Graham that pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
"excessive force that amounts to punishment."338 The progeny of Graham
strongly moves away from finding substantive rights in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.339 In contrast to the pretrial detainees discussed in Graham, students are free to leave after school officials
strike them; pretrial detainees still remain confined, subject to the state's continued authority over them. Because physical force used to discipline or punish falls within the Court's ever narrowing "seizure" definitions, students
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
See, e.g., IRWIN A. HYMAN, ET AL., ScHOOL DISCIPLINE AND ScHooL VIOLENCE: THE
TEACHER VARIANCE APPROACH 334-35 (1997) (stating that some teachers resist banning corporal punishment because of their misconception that hitting students controls violence in the
schools).
338 See supra text accompanying notes 233-235.
339 See supra text accompanying notes 234-237.
336
337
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today may seek protection under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
standard.

IV.

Conclusion

Public school students have an interest in personal security safeguarded
by the Fourth Amendment, as incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Historically, most courts have interpreted students'
personal security claims to fall under the substantive due process component
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides nominal protection.340 In
light of modem personal security jurisprudence, this Article advocates applying the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard when school officials
use physical force that constitutes a Fourth Amendment "seizure." As a result, when school officials grab students to break up fights or use bodily pain
to punish students, courts should analyze the resulting constitutional tort
claims under the Fourth Amendment.
The difference between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment is doctrinally significant because the Supreme Court has created multiple standards
for personal security claims depending on the context of the incident challenged. Although the Court has articulated numerous standards to establish
a violation of substantive due process, its most recent exegesis of personal
security litigation in County of Sacramento v. Lewis suggests that students'
personal security claims will virtually always fail if they are litigated under
substantive due process, and not fail so consistently if litigated under the
Fourth Amendment. In Lewis, the Court held that only conduct that is egregious-shocking to the conscience-establishes a violation of substantive due
process. In contrast, under the Court's Fourth Amendment personal security
litigation, a violation occurs if officials used unreasonable force.
Although abstract theory (~nd logic) would easily support giving significant and equal weight to the right to personal security, no matter whether the
right falls under the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court, has nevertheless articulated the Graham rule, declaring that only one
amendment applies when persons challenge officials' use of physical force. If
students are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, then they fall into the
deep chasm of the Fourteenth Amendment's conscience-shocking standard,
which provides little protection.
The Fourth Amendment and its reasonableness standard properly foster
public education by safeguarding students' cherished interest in personal security and protecting schools' ability to provide an educational environment,
one free from unreasonable violence from school officials.341
See supra note 12.
See, e.g., Patrick V. Gaffney, Arguments in Opposition to the Use of Corporal Punishment: A Comprehensive Review of the Literature, REPORT-150, at 5 (Dept. of Ed., Mar. 17, 1997)
340
341

(determining that physical punishment "represents a violation of children's rights and a debasement of the primary goals of education"); PAULA M. SHORT, RICK JAY SHORT, CHARLIE BLANTON, RETHINKING STUDENT DISCIPLINE: ALTERNATIVES THAT WoRK 86 (1994) (advocating
positive reinforcement as the best method to discipline students); CHARLES H. WoLFGANG,
SOLVING DISCrPLINE PROBLEMS, 13-264 (1995) (detailing positive approaches to student discipline). See generally MYRA C. CHEN, CAMPAIGNS AGAINST CoRPORAL PUNISHMENT: PRISON-
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ERS, SAILORS, WoMEN, AND CHILDREN IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 34 (1984) (noting that
"educational leaders angrily condemned teachers who refused to substitute moral suasion for the
rod and the birch").

